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RETHINKING PAROLE
By

MICMHAEL MANDEL*

Parole has received a lot of attention lately. The usual gaggle of hingnant
editorialists, angry letter-writers and ambitious backbenchers has been accompanied in the seventies by a virtually ceaseless flow of committee reports,
penological investigations, judicial decisions and ministerial announcements.
Most of this is interesting and some even illuminating, but it is all disappointing for one basic reason: the failure to subject the entire enterprise to a
systematic critical evaluation. Parole has taken on the aura of received truth.
It has become in penology as much a part of the liberal-reformist outlook as
mens rea in criminal law and due process in criminal procedure, and it is the
liberal-reformist view which dominates the field. But revered penal institutions are just the sort of item for which we ought to reserve our most potent
cynical acid. This system holds imprisoned over twenty thousand persons
every day.' A disproportionate majority are working class or poorer 2 and the
overwhelming majority of their offences are property offences;3 all this in a
society with ever deepening disparities of material well-being. 4 If, as Norval
Morris laments, 5 penological optimism is no longer fashionable, one can only
feel a sense of relief, however slight.
Parole 6 has been many (positive) things to many people. Some of these
*Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1 The average daily population for 1973 was 20,551: Statistics Canada, Correctional
Institution Statistics 1973 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1973) at 8.
2
See, e.g., L. James, Prisoners' Perceptions of Parole (Toronto: U. of T. Press,
1971) at 12; S. Binnie, Parole and Ontario Reform Institution Inmates (Toronto: U.
of T. Press, 1974) at 91; I. Wailer, Men Released from Prison (Toronto: U. of T.
Press, Toronto, 1974) at 59-60.
a James, id. at 231-32; Binnie, id. at 16; Wailer, id. at 46-51; Statistics Canada,
supra, note 1 at 20-23; Statistics Canada, Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences 1971
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971) at 38-41, 78-79.
4 The relevant statistics are collected and discussed by Leo A. Johnson in Poverty
in Wealth (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1974).
5 The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1974) at 12.
6
"Parole" is used in the sense in which it exists in Canada under the Parole Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2, namely conditional release from prison under supervision before
the expiry of the sentence of the court, selection for release being at the discretion of
the parole board. In Canada, eligibility normally commences after one third of the
sentence has been served: Parole Regulations, SOR/60-216 as amended, s. 2.
My primary concern is with the federal parole system as it applies to fixed term
sentences. All of what will be said, however, could be applied without much difficulty
to the "parole" systems of Ontario and British Columbia. Indeterminate sentencing (life
sentences and preventive detention) is, of course, inconceivable without some sort of
parole but this is only to say that an assessment of parole is also an assessment of one
aspect of indeterminate sentencing in general. In any event, indeterminate sentences are
sufficiently infrequent (one fifth of one percent of all prison sentences for indictable
offences in 1971) that if they are a special case they do not invalidate what follows.
Finally, "temporary" and "day" parole, under which a prisoner must return to
prison at intervals, are outside the scope of this paper.
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will be discussed a little later on. With some exceptions, that is a fairly welltravelled path. Before we get to these things, though, I want to look at the
"underside" of parole, that aspect which makes the matters to be discussed
later so much more crucial than they usually seem. It is the underside of
parole which raises the issue of justification, for it is only when parole is no
longer conceived of as benign or at worst neutral that questions of whether it
actually does what its advocates say it does will be asked in earnest.
There are many things seriously wrong with parole, each requiring
justification. I want to look closely at three of the less obvious ones. Others
will receive brief mention further on.
A. THE ECONOMICS OF PAROLE
It is commonplace among advocates of parole to point to the enormous
money savings in the marginal substitution of parole for prison. Statements
of the sort "It costs only x dollars per year to keep a person on parole, while
it costs xy dollars to keep him in prison" are found virtually wherever parole
is discussed. The value of y has changed from time to time. The seminal
Fauteux Report7 put it at between 32 and 35 (i.e. prison was considered to
be 32 to 35 times as expensive as parole) in 1956. The National Parole
Board (NPB) in its Annual Reports has put it variously at 3.5 (in 1963 and
1964), 4.3 (1965), 3.0-4.0 (1966), and 7.2-16.3 (1967 and 1968). The
Ouimet Reports put it at 7.1 in 1969, but admitted this to be slightly inflated
as certain administrative costs and costs of supervision undertaken by private
agencies were not accounted for. Rough calculations support a figure even
higher than this one for the fiscal year of 1973-74.9
7 Report of a Committee Appointed to Inquire Into the Principles and Procedures
Followed in the Remission Service of the Department of Justice of Canada (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1956) at 52.
8Report of The Canadian Committee on Corrections; Toward Unity: Criminal
Justice and Corrections, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 331.
0 1 derive my own figure of 8.4 as follows:
The Parole Act cost $8,497,840 to administer in 1973-74 (Canada, Estimates for
the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1976 at 25, 12 ff.). The best estimate that can be
made from existing data (see below, note 12) is that roughly 63.3 percent of this was
spent on activities in the nature of selection, as opposed to supervision. Of these activities
821 percent dealt with parole (as opposed to mandatory supervision, which has no
selection component, and pardons, which have no supervision components) (Solicitor
General of Canada, Annual Report 1973-74 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at
52-54). The total selection expenditure was therefore roughly $4,416,268. Of the 36.7
percent or $3,118,708 spent on activities in the nature of supervision, 14.4 percent of
these involved mandatory supervision and ought not to be included, leaving $2,669,614.
The total spent, therefore, on (ordinary and day) parole in fiscal 1973-74 was
$7,085,882. During that period the average daily population on parole was 4,872 (Annual Report 1973-74, id. at 53 and a personal communication to me from the Director
of Research and Planning of the National Parole Service regarding the number of day
parolees under supervision during 1973). The cost per parolee was therefore $1,454.41.
The cost of operating the penitentiary system in 1973-74 was $110,034,571
(Estimates, id.). The average daily penitentiary population in the same period was 9,033
(Annual Report 1973-74, id. at 40; Solicitor General of Canada, Annual Report 1972-73
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) at 49). Therefore, the cost per prisoner was
$12,181.39.
$12,181.39. Of course, these figures take no account of the differences in costs which
may exist at the level of provincial prisons..
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Parole, in any view, is certainly cheaper than prison. But the point I
want to make here, a point that is obscured by statements of the type in the
preceding paragraph, is that parole itself is not free. In fact it is very expensive. It cost somewhere in the neighbourhood of seven and one half million dollars in fiscal 1973-74 and it will probably cost ten and one half million and fifteen and one half million in fiscal 1974-75 and 1975-76 respectively. 10 This is a great deal of money on any scale. Much good could
be done with it, and if there is a cheaper way to do what parole is designed
to do to time spent in prison, that way should be taken unless there is some
good reason to the contrary. There is no dearth of alleged good reasons to the
contrary, and we will look at them shortly. But in the meantime two conceptual
alternatives around which the discussion can proceed suggest themselves:
1) The elimination of both the selection and supervision elements of
parole, leaving only the reduction of time spent in prison which it currently effects. 1 This would retain the savings of the current system and
add to them all the money currently spent on parole.
2) The elimination of only the selection process, leaving supervision and
reduction. This should be'kept as a separate alternative because the
reasons for suggesting that we could get along quite nicely without the
selection process are different from those for suggesting the same thing
with respect to supervision.
Clearly the first alternative would represent a substantially greater saving
than the second, but it is difficult to know how much greater. This question of
relative costs is an important one, and it grows in importance the less certain
we become about the value or lack of it of either the selection or supervision
elements of parole.
Information on the relative costs of selection and supervision is extremely
scarce because of the multiplicity of tasks carried out by members of the
National Parole Service. A very rough estimate is that 63.3 percent of the
work done is "selection work" and only 36.7 percent "supervision work". 12
10 These figures include the costs of mandatory supervision, i.e. the costs of supervision and cancellation. During 1973-74 an average of 817 persons were on mandatbry
supervision. During that same period 507 persons had their mandatory supervision cancelled: Annual Report 1973-74, id. at 54.

"We need not concern ourselves at this point as with how a reduction could--be
effected without the discretionary selection process, whether through random selection
or uniform proportionate reduction, or some other means. The point being made here
is that if all that is wanted of a parole system is a reduction in time spent in prison,
then discretionary selection is unnecessary. Other justifications for the parole system
and discretionary selection are discussed below.
121

base this estimate on two reports by the Management Consulting Service of

the Department of the Solicitor General of Canada (National Parole Service Study on
Stafing Standards 1973) and supplementary material provided to me in a persofial
communication from the Director of Research and Planning of the National Parole
Service (see Appendix A). From these I estimated that 57.7 percent of the activity
under "Field Operations" was "case preparation' (for the selection process) and only
42.3 percent supervision of those already selected. Field Operations constituted 67.6
percent of the "man years" allocated for the administration of the ParoleAct. The rest
came under "Headquarters" and I assigned 75 percent of this to selection, which is
probably a conservative estimate given the number of decisions which have to be made
by the NPB each year (over 14,000 in 1973-74: Annual Report 1973-74, supra, note 9
at 52-54).
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In terms of the Estimates for 1975-76 this works out to approximately
$9,775,000 on selection (and a saving of this amount with the second alternative above) and $5,668,000 on supervision.
In any event, it is clearly established that despite the relative saving
parole represents over prison, it has itself a cost which must be justified. But
this is not all. The relative cost arguments have assumed that the system
of parole has resulted not only in a reduction in the portion of sentences of
imprisonment which must be served in custody, but also in a reduction in the
overall level of imprisonment. They have, in other words, assumed that
sentences have not increased in length in response to the shortening effect of
parole. But what if they have? Then the cost of parole would have to be
added to the cost of imprisonment. There would not even be a comparative
saving. What if, finally, the total time spent in prison were longer as a result
of parole?
B.

PAROLE AND SENTENCE LENGTH

1.

The Direct Effect
Obviously, when a prisoner is paroled and his parole is neither revoked
nor forfeited he spends less time in custody than he would have had he not
been paroled. In this direct sense parole results in less incarceration. In order
to calculate the overall direct effect of parole on prison sentences we need
answers to the following empirical questions: What proportion of prisoners
eligible for parole actually get it? How much of their sentence do those
paroled serve in prison before being paroled? What proportion of parolees
have their paroles cancelled and are returned to prison? How much time is
spent in prison after a parole cancellation?
Table 1 shows the percentages of final decisions of the NPB which have
been for granting and for denying parole since its inception in 1959.13 Various
trends can be discerned. From 1959 on there is a decrease in percentage
granted reaching a nadir of 21.7 percent in 1964. The trend then reverses
itself and rises steadily to a peak of 75.3 percent in 1970. It then declines
again and indications are that it has continued to decline beyond 1972.14
13 Not included are decisions to "defer" parole, for that merely means that a final
decision has been postponed. Ultimately the prisoner whose application is deferred will
come up for a final decision.
Also not included are decisions recorded as "no action" defined in contradictory
terms as "a previous decision is not changed in the light of further developments or
representations" (Annual Reports of NPB 1962-69), and "cases where the Board has
decided not to grant parole where the time remaining before a provincial Parole Board
assumes jurisdiction does not facilitate the comprehensive inquiry necessary to service
the best interests of the applicant and the Community" (NPB Statistics 1970-72). "No
action" decisions accounted for 2.2 percent of all decisions from 1961 to 1967 and to
the extent that they included decisions to deny parole, our percentage for parole granted
is slightly inflated.
14The Solicitor General's Annual Report 1973-74, supra, note 9, discloses that
between April 1, 1973 and March 31, 1974, 46.6 percent of the final decisions of the
NPB were in favour of granting and 53.4 percent in favour of denying parole.

A report in the Globe and Mail, June 3, 1975 cites an approval rate of 32 percent

in 1973 and 42 percent in 1974.
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TABLE 1
Decisions of the National Parole Board to
Grant and to Deny Parole* 1959-1972
Year

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

Granted

Granted

Denied

Denied

2790
42.2
2038
1959
3594
41.3
2525
1960
5404
29.1
2213
1961
5085
26.2
1803
1962
5682
23.3
1725
1963
6088
21.7
1688
1964
6123
23.7
1905
1965
4810
31.3
2190
1966
4072
43.5
3131
1967
2571
55.2
3162
1968
1949
69.2
4371
1969
1706
75.3
5193
1970
2280
69.2
5117
1971
2878
56.9
3800
1972
TOTAL
55,032
42.6
40,861
1959-72
*Includes all types of parole except "temporary" parole and "day"

57.8
58.7
70.9
73.8
76.7
78.3
76.3
68.7
56.544.8
30.8
24.7
30.8
43.1
57.4
parole.

SOURCES: Annual Reports of the National Parole Board 1959-1969;
National Parole Board Statistics 1965-1972
For our purposes, the most important figures in Table 1 are the "total"
figures for 1959-1972. We will use these figures - 42.6 percent granted,
57.4 percent denied - for future calculations. In this way we will be limited
to an assessment of the impact parole has had so far. But we will be more
confident in it than we would be in a projection into the future based on
current trends which history shows are often subject to reversal.
If all eligible cases had been considered in the decisions covered by
Table 1, this would mean that 42.6 percent of the prison sentences imposed
had experienced some initial reduction in the time to be served. All penitentiary prisoners are automatically considered for parole, but prisoners in provincial institutions aie considered only on application.', Do all provincial
prisoners apply? This is an especially important question in light of Waller's
finding with respect to federal prisoners that an important motive for not
applying is an acute sense of one's own poor chances of success.1 6
There does not seem to be any direct evidence of the proportion of
eligible provincial prisoners who have applied for parole. However, we do
know the proportion of eligible federal prisoners who have applied and this
15 Parole Act, supra, note 6, s. 8.
' 6 Supra, note 2 at 189-90, 199.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 13,'*NO. 2

TABLE 2
Percentage of Eligible Federal Prisoners
Applying for Parole* 1960-1971
Year

1960

Number Eligible

4125**

Number Applying

Percentage Applying

3506

85

1961
4486
2871
64
1962
4322
2766
64
1963
4474
2550
57
1964
4625
2590
56
1965
4993
3046
61
1966
4382
2717
62
1967
4282
2826
66
1968
4463
3169
71
1969
4365
3274
75
1970
5369
4456
83
1971
5130
4566
89
TOTAL
1960-71
55,016
38,337
69.7
*Ordinary parole only.
**All numbers are approximate, having been derived from percentages.
SOURCE: Task Force on Release of Inmates, Report, Appendix B.
is shown in Table 2. The lowest level was in 1964 but there has been a
steady rise ever since and due to the introduction of "mandatory supervision '" 17 in 1970, high application rates can be expected for the future.' 8

As we are concerned with provincial application rates, it should be noted
that mandatory supervision does not apply to provincial prisoners.' 9 Apart
from this, though, can we assume similar application rates for provincial and
federal prisoners? There seems every reason that the rates should be similar.
For one thing, success rates of federal and of provincial applicants have been
very close over the years 20 Furthermore, the same disadvantages of parole
(the length of the parole period and the severe consequences of cancel17
Parole Act, supra, note 6, s. 15, implemented in 1970. Under the new system,
where earned and statutory remission exceed sixty days, instead of being completely
discharged the prisoner must undergo supervision for the duration of his remission time.
He is subject to the same sanctions for failure to comply as is a parolee.
Is There was a slight drop to an 85.3 percent application rate in 1972-73: Annual
Report 1972-73, supra, note 9 at 54. This was probably due to the NPB's recently falling release rate.
19 SOR/70-339 proclaims the amendment in force only "in respect of persons who
are sentenced to imprisonment in or transferred to any class of penitentiary on and
after the first day of August 1970".
20 Between 1959 and 1971, 47.1 percent of federal applicants and 47.4 percent of
provincial applicants were granted ordinary paroles: Task Force on Release of Inmates,
Ilugessen Report (1973) (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) Appendix A.
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TABLE 3
Final Decisions of the National Parole Board
1960-1972 by Jurisdiction of Origin of Applications*

Year

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
TOTAL
1960-72

Percentage Provincial

Percentage Federal

Total

45.6
51.0
46.4
48.6
48.5
45.6
48.4
'50.5
62.0
60.4
50.7
54.0
54.0

54.4
49.0
53.6
51.4
51.5
54.4
51.6
49.5
38.0
39.6
49.3
46.0
46.0

6119
7617
6888
7407
7776
8028
7000
7203
5733
6320
6899
7397
6678

51.0

49.0

91,065

*Applications for "temporary" and "day" parole are not included.
SOURCES: Annual Reports of the National Parole Board 1960-1969;
National Parole Board Statistics 1965-1972.
lation2 l ) exist for both federal and provincial parolees. In the absence of
direct evidence, we ought to be prepared to assume the same application
rates. If anything, this will inflate the rate of applications because of the effect
of mandatory supervision.
We will assume, then, that the parole applicants from provincial institutions have been 69.7 percent of those eligible to apply. Final decisions on
provincial applications for parole represented 51.0 percent of all final decisions between 1960 and 1972.
It follows that the final decision of the NPB taken in total have concerned only 81.9 percent of all the eligible population, i.e. of all those sentenced to prison under federal statutes. 22 If 42.6 percent of these prisoners
have been granted parole, then only 34.9 percent of all eligible prisoners have
been granted parole.
21

The parole period extends to the end of the sentence including remission: Parole
Act, supra, note 6, s. 13; Penitentiary Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6, s. 25; Prisons and Reformatories Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-21, s. 19.
A prisoner whose parole is revoked or forfeited must serve the time remaining
unexpired when paroled (i.e. he gets no credit for time served on parole) plus the statutory
remission which had accrued up to that time: Parole Act, supra, note 6, ss. 20 and 21;
Penitentiary Act, id., s. 24(2); Prisonsand Reformatories Act, id., s. 18(2).
22
For every 73 provincial prisoners eligible for parole there are 51 applicants. For
every 49 federal prisoners eligible for parole, 49 are considered. Therefore, out of
every 122 eligible prisoners 100 or 81.9- percent are considered.
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The next question that must be answered in order to assess the direct
effect of parole on the length of time spent in prison is: of those sentences
affected by parole, how much of a reduction in' time served has been
effected? Table 4 sets out the available information. In this case a quite
TABLE 4
Proportion of Sentences Spent in
Prison by Parolees* Before
Being Paroled 1959-1972

Year

Number
Paroled

Percentage
serving
under 35%
of their
sentences

Percentage
serving
35% to
under 50%

Percentage
serving
50% to
under 70%

Percentage
serving
70% and over

61.0
23.9
1959
1720
1.7
13.4
22.0
55.0
18.0
1960
2320
5.0
14.5
55.7
21.0
1961
1985
8.9
18.8
9.0
15.6
56.6
1962
1592
7.0
18.0
55.0
20.0
1963
1519
56.0
16.0
1964
1528
9.0
19.0
16.0
1776
10.0
27.0
47.0
1965
30.0
44.0
17.0
1966
2067
9.0
17.0
9.0
31.0
43.0
1967
2496
27.4
46.0
12.5
1968
2954
14.2
11.1
47.7
15.4
25.8
1969
4147
1.3
35.0
35.4
1970
5068
28.3
29.3
1.1
4949
36.5
32.9
1971
.8
31.7**
52.4**
15.1
1972
3778
TOTAL
42.2
10.9
17.9
29.0
1959-72 37,899
*Does not include those on "temporary" or "day" parole.
**These figures are only approximate. In 1972 new categories were introduced preventing direct comparison with previous years. However, 1972
represents a substantial shift to early release and should be included. The
actual percentages were:
Over 40% Over5O%
10% and Over 10% Over 20% Over3O%
to 50%
to 60%
to 20%
to 30%
to 40%
under
29.6
10.5
2.1
5.3
45.6
1.5
Over 60% Over 70% -Over 80% Over 90%
to 100%
to 70%
to 80%
to 90%
.2
.2
.4
4.7
To derive the figures in the table it was assumed that there was an equal
distribution within each of the 1972 categories.
SOURCES: Annual Reports of the National Parole Board 1959-1969;
National Parole Board Statistics 1965-1972

19751

Rethinking Parole

marked trend in favour of earlier release dates is somewhat disguised by
averaging the experience of fourteen years, but one cannot be sure of the
cause of the trend or whether it will endure. It is likely that it is at least in
part a result of the introduction of mandatory supervision in 1970 which
would naturally cause the Board to hand out fewer late parole dates. This
would make the trend relatively permanent, but would also result in fewer
paroles being granted. We will, in any case, remain with the overall averages.
As was pointed out above, they do demonstrate the effect parole has had.
m allows us to
A simple mathematical assumptionF
go one step further
and derive a single figure from the four in Table 4 which will approximate
the average time parolees have served in prison before they have been
paroled: an even 50 percent.
23

The assumption is that paroles are equally distributed throughout each category
so that the average parole in the 50-70 percent category is at 60 percent and so on. If
1972, the first year when finer discriminations could be made, is any indication, this
will slightly deflate the average. Using the 1972 distributions within categories (i.e.
assuming that within 50-70 the distribution will be 69.1 percent in the 50-60 category
and 30.9 percent in the 60-70 category as they were in 1972) the result would be 50.8
percent as opposed to 50.0 percent.
The reader will note another important assumption which I have made, namely
that the overall proportions (percentage of sentences affected and percentage reduction
in these sentences) have occurred equally among all lengths of sentences, or that countervailing tendencies have combined to produce this effect (e.g., longer term prisoners
being paroled less frequently but earlier in their sentences or vice versa). If this were
not true, the figures in the text would distort the actual situation. For example, a decrease of 10 percent in a ten year sentence and 50 percent in a six month sentence is
not equivalent to a 30 percent reduction in each, nor is a 10 percent reduction in the
former and no reduction in the latter equivalent to a 5 percent reduction in each.
Relevant data are only available since 1968 and there are serious gaps. In the
period 1968 to 1972 those serving sentences of two years or over served, on the average,
15.4 percent less of their sentences than those with sentences of less than two years
(42.4 percent as opposed to 50.1 percent). However, they were as close at 54.9 percent to 58.8 percent in 1972 and it cannot be known what the proportions were before
1968.
If they were similar, then the figures in the text would have underestimated the
effect of parole somewhat, unless there were a countervailing tendency to grant fewer
paroles to those with longer sentences. But this cannot be known because of the failure
of the statistics since 1968 to record decisions to "defer" parole which are virtually restricted to applicants serving more than two years imprisonment. The Board can only
"defer" and cannot "deny' when two years or more remain to be served. In 1966 and
1967 decisions to defer parole were made almost ten times as frequently with respect
to applicants serving sentences of two years or more as with respect to other applicants
(17.4 percent of all decisions to 1.8 percent). If this obtained in 1968-1972, prisoners
with shorter sentences would have been more successful in getting paroles than prisoners
with longer sentences by 61.3 percent successful applications to 57.2 percent, perhaps
enough to counteract the tendency to grant long-term prisoners earlier paroles. Excluding
decisions to defer, however, long-term prisoners appear to have been more likely to
be successful in parole applications by 69.3 percent to 62.4 percent over the 1968 to
1972 period.
At any rate, these are not large differences, and until better data is made available,
the original assumption is as good as any and it has the virtue of simplicity. This
assumption is the only one made here that might underestimate the effect of parole. Any
distortions resulting from the other assumptions would overestimate it.

The above figures were derived from the National Parole Board Statistics 1966-72.
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However, the fact that the average parolee serves x percent of his sentence in prison does not necessarily mean that parole has resulted in a 100-x
percent reduction in time spent in prison, for these percentages have been
calculated without regard for earned or statutory remission which together
can amount to slightly less than one third (32.4 percent) of the total sentence. 24 Surprisingly, there are no published statistics from which we could
discover the amount of remission earned and retained by Canadian prisoners.
To read the recent official reports, one would think that it is very rare for a
prisoner not to earn or to lose remission. 25 Michael Jackson's study of
Matsqui Institution2 6 suggests that this is not entirely accurate. During 19691972 an average daily population of 301 received an average 42 sentences
per year of forfeiture of statutory remission averaging 26 days each. Even
this, however, amounts to an average loss of only 4.0 percent of the statutory
remission for the year (leaving earned remission untouched). We are probably overestimating things if we assume that on the average a parolee would
have lost 25% of all of his remission had he not been paroled, especially
since the selection criteria used by the NPB 27 suggest that those selected for
parole are also those most likely to receive and retain their full remission.
If the average parolee would have received 75 percent of his remission
had he not been paroled, then the fact that he served 50 percent of his sentence in prison would mean that 28parole had effected a reduction of 33.9
percent in the time spent in prison.
Our final two questions concern cancelled paroles. The proportionate
sentence reduction so far indicated assumes that parolees are not returned to
prison but in fact many are. And at the present time, not only is no credit
given for time successfully served on parole, but those returned to prison are
actually penalized the statutory remission standing to their credit when
24

Statutory remission amounts to 25 percent of the total sentence and is credited

on entry "subject to good conduct": Penitentiary Act s. 22; Prisons and Reformatories
Act, id., s. 17; earned remission can amount to three days "of each calendar -month
during which he has applied himself industriously": Penitentiary Act, id., s. 24, Prisons
and Reformatories Act, id., s. 18.
25
The Hugessen Report, supra, note 20 at 27; Standing Senate Committee on Legal

and Constitutional Affairs, Parolein Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974) (The
Goldenberg Report) at 58: ".... during the Committee staff meetings with penitentiary
and parole staff throughout the country, the view most often heard was that most
inmates, even if they forfeit part of their remission during incarceration, are released
with most of the remission to their credit. Even though they may have forfeited some
remission, it has been reinstated prior to their release date which was established upon
admission to the institution."
20 M. Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls - A Study of the Disciplinary Process in
a Canadian Penitentiary (1974), 12 O.H.L.J. 1 at 52.
27
See text accompanying notes 66 to 71.
28 75 percent of remission is equal to 24.3 percent of the total sentence, leaving
only 75.7 percent of the sentence to serve. If one is paroled after serving 50 percent
of the total sentence, the reduction is 75.7-50 percent = 33.9 percent
75.7
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paroled.29 For the purpose of our calculations this means that a cancelled
parole is worse than no parole at all. First, those cancelled should be deducted from the total number granted and second, modification should be
made for the penalty.
Between 1959 and 1972, 7,412 paroles, 18.1 percent of those granted,
were cancelled. 30 This means that instead of 40,861 prison terms being
shortened by parole (see supra, Table 1) only 33,449 were shortened, 37.8
percent of those considered for parole, 31 percent of those eligible for parole.
This figure is inflated because it does not take account of those granted
parole in 1972 and before who will have their paroles cancelled in the future.
Finally, as for what modification to make for loss of statutory remission,
the average parolee will have served 50.0 percent of his sentence when
paroled and will therefore have accrued statutory remission amounting to
12.5 percent of his total sentence. This will have been lost to all those whose
paroles were cancelled. However, prisoners may be re-paroled and escape
some or all of the effects of the penalty. Giving parole violators neither a
better nor worse chance of parole than all prisoners, and assuming that if
paroled, they will be paroled before they are affected by their loss of remission, i.e., being as conservative as possible, the total effect of the penalty on
the reduction effected by parole can be estimated at 2.0 percent.2 1 Instead of
effecting a 33.9 percent reduction in the time to be served, when penalties for
cancellation of parole are taken into account the estimated total reduction
is 31.9 percent in the sentences that have been reduced. As only 31
percent of prison sentences have been affected by parole, the total direct
effect of parole on time spent in prison is to reduce it by 9.9 percent.
To recapitulate: on the basis of our estimates, 82.1 percent of those
eligible for parole (all prisoners) have been considered for parole; 42.6
percent of these have been granted parole; 18.1 percent of paroles granted
have been cancelled; 31 percent of all prison terms have been reduced by
29 It was held in Marcotte v. Deputy Attorney-General of Canada (1974), 19
C.C.C. (2d) 257 by the Supreme Court of Canada that the penalty was not authorized
by the legislation 'as it stood before being amended by R.S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s. 102.
However, that amendment put the issue beyond doubt and the opinion of the Court
was carefully limited to the unamended legislation. See now Parole Act, supra, note 6,
s.20, 21; Penitentiary Act, supra, note 21, s.24(1); Prisons and Reformatories Act,
supra, note 21, s. 18(2).

80 The yearly revocations and forfeitures have been as follow:

1959
118
1969
711

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
191
262
217
246
220
307
340
406
551
1970
1971
1972
1228
1326
1289
Sources: Annual Reports of the National Parole Board, 1959-1969; National Parole

Board Statistics, 1965-1972.
81 18.1 percent lose back 12.5 percent of their total sentence and 69 percent of
these are not re-paroled. In other words, 18.1 percent x 12.5 percent x 69 percent = 1.56
percent is lost back to sentence length. Therefore, the average reduction is not 75.77-50c
but rather

75.75-5L56% -_
75.7%

31.9%.

75.7%
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parole; they have been reduced on the average by 31.9 percent; and the
total effect
of parole has been a 9.9 percent reduction in the time spent in
prison. 2
The Indirect Effect
I have argued for a tentative figure of 9.9 percent as the maximum
overall reduction effected by the parole system in the time spent in custody
under fixed term prison sentences. I have called this the direct effect of parole
on sentence length. However, suggestions have recently been made that the
parole system might have a contrary indirect effect, i.e. a sentence lengthening effect.88 The way in which it can be argued to have done this is quite
simple. Sentencers have merely lengthened the sentences they would otherwise have imposed in view of the fact that offenders may be paroled before
the entire sentence is served. The fact that this has sometimes been done
will be easy to demonstrate, and this will mean that the effect that parole
has had on the length of incarceration is to some extent illusory. The difficult
question is to what extent. It may have only been a slight and insignificant
matter which has not impaired the essential efficacy of parole in emptying the
2.

82This

would mean that parole has been working at less than one fifth (17.7
percent) its capacity on the basis of eligibility after one third of the sentence and the
assumption made earlier about remission.
33 See, e.g., American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice (New York:
Hill & Wang, 1971) at 91:
Three trends are significant in appraising the consequences of California's adoption of the rehabilitative ideal ['one of the most indeterminate forms of the indeterminate sentence system']. First, the length of sentences has steadily increased.
From 1959 to 1969 the median time served has risen from twenty-four to thirtysix months, the longest in the country. [emphasis in original]
and Jessica Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment (New York: Knopf, 1971) at 83-84:
While the indeterminate sentence seems to imply a policy of early release for the
rehabilitated offender, it is actually a means of assuring much longer sentences
[and quoting
for most prisoners than would normally be imposed by judges ....
one Amos W. Butler, an early administrator of Indiana's indeterminate system]
'Under the definite sentence, our courts measured out so much punishment for so
much crime. Having served his time, the prisoner was free to go. Under the
present system of indeterminate sentence with parole, accompanied as it is with
efforts at reformation, the average length of sentence is markedly longer.'
and Sol Rubin, Law of Criminal Correction(2nd ed. St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1973) at 650:
... contrary to the assumption that parole is ameliorative, reducing the term ..
parole has increased time served in prison.
and Norval Morris, supra, note 5 at 48:
Whether overall parole has indeed achieved a reduction of prison time served in
America is speculative. In individual cases it has made possible leniencies that
were politically impractical at the time of trial, but it is not known whether this
has been counterbalanced by the public's and the judge's knowledge of the operation of parole and by his accommodating the sentences he imposes to parole
board practices. The tendency of parole boards to overpredict danger and to
follow the politically safer path of prolonging incarceration because of exaggerated
expectations of criminality on parole... would lead one to suspect that parole
may well have increased total prison time. But reliable data are lacking.
and the Goldenberg Report, supra, note 25 at 51:
*. Dr. Ciale's evidence suggests that Canadian courts have been attempting to
counteract the effect of the parole system.
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prisons, or it may have obliterated it totally. It may even have over-compensated and resulted in longer periods of incarceration. If this last possibility
were fact, it would not be the first time that a penal measure has had the
opposite effect to that expected. 34
How do we go about investigating these questions? The logical starting
point would be to ask the sentencers themselves, though of course this would
only shed light on the conscious level of motivation. Anyway, this is precisely
what Hogarth did in his recent study of Ontario Magistrates and, startlingly
enough, 42 Magistrates of his sample of 71 (59.2 percent) admitted that
"they sometimes increased the length of sentence imposed ... in light of the
possibility of parole being granted."3 5 The motives admitted to were of three
sorts: in the interests of rehabilitation - "in order to give the institutional
personnel ample opportunity to work with the offender in hopes that he
would respond quickly and be considered for early parole"; in the interests
of public relations - Magistrates would impose long deterrent sentences, and
then write to the Board on behalf of the offender: "In this way they felt that
they could appear to be punitive without serious consequences to the
offender"; and finally "in order to ensure that the offender would not be
'back on the streets' in a relatively short time", i.e. to counteract the effect
of parole on the time to be spent in prison.
Hogarth suggested that this was illegal. In that he was only partly right.
But the legal question is complex. As there is no legislation covering the
matter, the only law to be found is in the opinions of the various Courts of
Appeal on sentencing appeals. To understand the appellate approach to
parole, one must first understand the highly artificial way in which the courts
reason on sentencing appeals.3 6 Very briefly, they ostensibly attempt to ensure
that there has been a proper 'blending' by the trial judge of the various aims
of punishment (deterrence, reformation, 'protection of the public' - by
which is usually meant the incapacitation of the offender through segregation
- and, to a decreasing extent, retribution) as they apply to the case at
hand. This the trial judge is to do by taking into account all of the relevant
facts of the case and prescribing the sentence that best serves the aims of
sentencing in the light of these facts. Argument on sentencing appeals usually
revolves around an allegation that the trial judge has not taken a fact or
facts into account, at all or sufficiently, that he ought to have taken into
account. The facts in issue usually concern aspects of the offender's 'character'
or the 'gravity' of the offence, but on occasion they concern such other matters as the prevalence of the offence, sentences given elsewhere for similar
offences, or whether a plea of guilty has been entered. The question arises
whether these facts and others, such as the availability of parole, which are
34

See R. F. Sparks, The Use of Suspended Sentence (1971), Crim. L. Rev. 384.
John Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1971)
at 176-77.
86 Some leading cases are: R. v. Willaert (1953), 105 C.C.C. 172 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Jones (1956), 115 C.C.C. 273 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Hinch and Salanski, [1968]
3 C.C.C. 39 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Morrisette and two others (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 307
(Sask. C&.).
35
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obviously relevant in a factual way to at least some conceptions of the aims
of sentencing, are legally relevant, are 'factors' which should be thrown in
with the others in deriving the sentence.
As far as the status of parole as a factor is concerned, there appear to
be four positions which have found their way into the reported cases. Two
have been uniformly rejected. The other two each seem to have their
adherents, though one is more widely and firmly held than the other.
The first universally unpopular position is best illustrated by the Ontario

Court of Appeal decision in Wilmott,3 7 a conviction for rape. The sentence

was 12 years, but according to the trial judge, it would only have been
"somewhere from six to eight years", if there had been no possibility of
parole. Furthermore, when handing out this sentence, the trial judge opined
that "the philosophy behind parole is that it is desirable to have criminals
under some control and guidance for a long period" and that "if the Parole
Board ... is to be made a success the obvious existence of such a Board must
be recognized and, if otherwise fitting in with the general scheme of law
and policies, should be supported. Their policies cannot be supported unless
long sentences are imposed".38
In other words, the trial judge imposed a longer sentence than he otherwise would have in order to give the Parole Board more time to work its
magic and rehabilitate the offender. 89 The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to eight years. In doing so it expressed firm opposition to this overly
supportive posture:
I can not agree that a Court in exercising its powers of sentencing is to function
merely as an appendage or appurtenance of the Parole Board and bound to support the policies of the Board inconsistent with its duties under the Criminal
Code... For a Court to impose long sentences to support the policies of the
Board would amount not only to a delegation to the Board of its duties, but a
substantial abandonment of them.40

Another example of this sort of approach may be found in Holden,4 1
where the British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced a sentence of fourteen
months imprisonment for wilful damage to property to six months, because
in its view the trial judge had given the longer term in order "to give the
authorities an opportunity to rehabilitate [the offender], leaving it to the
Parole Board to release [him] when it thinks proper to do so. ''42 The probation officer had recommended "a sentence long enough to involve review by
the National Parole Board" in order to "motivate this man towards his own
rehabilitation".43 The Magistrate apparently followed this advice, but the
87 [1967] 1 C.C.C. 171.
38
1d. at 174-75.
3
0 "Reformation is the work of time," said the American Correctional Association
in 1870, quoted in Mitford, supra, note 3 at 83.
4
o Supra, note 37 at 185.
41 [1963] 2 C.C.C. 394.
421d.

at 397.

431d. at 395.
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Court of Appeal regarded it as impermissible: "Heavier sentences must not
be imposed for collateral purposes in the professed interests of society or of
the prisoner, either to extend the minimum time the prisoner must serve
in custody until the Parole Board
before obtaining parole, or to keep him
44
decides he may properly be released".
The second uniformly rejected position is much less subtle. The sentencer must not try to counteract the effect of parole on the length of time in
custody by imposing a longer sentence to delay parole eligibility. Sentencers
are not as willing to express opposition to the Parole Board as they are to
express support, so this kind of motive can only be inferred from statements
made during sentencing about the availability of parole. The best example
is probably Heck,4 5 wherein the British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced a
five year term for false pretences to two and one half years. The trial judge
had said that his sentence could not be lower "particularly in view of the
parole system which now makes it possible for an accused to apply for parole
after having served one-third of the sentence, which in this case would make
the accused eligible for parole after having served slightly more than eighteen
months". 40 The Court of Appeal considered it equally illegitimate "that the
sentence should be increased as to offset any possible reduction by the parole
board" as that "there should be a long sentence, leaving it to the parole board
to release the prisoner when it thinks proper to do So1"47 (the position discussed above).
None of these decisions go so far as to deny that parole could ever be
taken into account in sentencing. Both Courts have made that clear elsewhere. They merely say the obvious and easy thing, that it is no part of the
sentencing function to support or subvert what the Parole Board might be
trying to do. Only one Court of Appeal, The Newfoundland Supreme Court,
seems to hold to what might be called the "purist" approach. In Coffey 48 a
sentence of four years imprisonment for theft of a cheque was reduced to
three years, with the following unequivocal statement:
It would seem that in this case the magistrate may have been influenced by the
actual length of time the accused would spend in prison, rather than to the
length of the sentence to be imposed. The duty of any court in imposing sentence
is to determine the length of the term of imprisonment without consideration of
any reduction due to the grant of parole, or any other reduction. It is not the
concern of the court what disposition may be made of the prisoner by the
executive authorities. The law lays upon us the duty of determining the innocence
or guilt of an accused person and if found guilty his punishment within the
precise limits which the law prescribes. In imposing punishment we may not
consider the matter of subsequent parole; this is not within our sphere.40

44 ld. at 395.
45 (1963), 41 W.W.R. 629.

46 Id.at 630.
47 ld.

48(1965), 51 M.P.R. 7; earlier tendencies of a similar nature can be found in R.
v. Switlishoff (1950), 97 C.C.C. 132 (B.C.C.A.) and R. v. Courtenay (1956), 115

C.C.C. 260 (B.C.C.A.).
49 ld. at 8-9.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal seemed headed in the purist direction in
Bailey and Protheroe50 where sentences for armed robbery were reduced
from life and twelve years to two sentences of seven years each. This was not
a case of a sentencer mentioning parole (or more appropriately in this case,
remission). The majority opinion merely stated, perhaps in response to
argument,
* . I I have put from my mind the fact that this man may be relieved from
serving the full amount of the sentence as determined by the Court by reason of
time off which he might earn or that may be conferred upon him by statute. To
regard these things in determining the sentence and, accordingly, to lengthen the
term, is obviously to be at cross-purposes with Parliament. 51

Whatever its cogency, the purist approach does not seem to be the
predominant one at present. A fourth, which might be termed the 'realist'
approach, has been adopted by the Courts of Appeal for Ontario, British

Columbia and Alberta. It holds that between the extremes of support and
subversion, the availability of parole and remission is a factor that may be
taken into account by the sentencer when he is engaged in his 'blending'
exercise. For example, in Holden, though it reduced the sentence in the
instant case, the Court cautioned obiter:
So that there may be no misunderstanding of what I propose to say later, I
think it should be said now that when it is urged that a prisoner has learned his
lesson, and that a light sentence, or suspended sentence will aid in his rehabilitation, or pleas of that nature are advanced, a trial Court may properly, in its
discretion, reject such pleas and leave it to the Parole Board to release the
prisoner on parole when it is satisfied that 52the prisoner by his conduct has
demonstrated that he should be granted parole.

This was largely echoed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Wilmott, also
obiter. "In my opinion" said McLennan, J.A. for the Court, "a Court in
determining an appropriate sentence of imprisonment may, quite properly,
take into consideration the provisions of the Parole Act and the duties of
the Parole Board under the Act and Regulations";s and he proceeded to
give examples. First, he agreed with what was said in Holden, that the availability of parole could be considered in order to reject a claim for a "light
sentence" in the interests of the offender's rehabilitation. He also, in effect,
approved of the public relations gambit admitted to by Hogarth's Magistrates:
.[The availability of parole] is also relevant where deterrence to others than the
particular offender is of importance. As an illustration, suppose an outbreak of a
particular type of crime in a community - not an uncommon occurrence - it
would be proper for a trial Court to impose a severe sentence on the offender
designed to deter others and it could do so with the reasonable assurance that
with the availability of parole the particular offender would not be incarcerated
for a longer period than appropriate, provided always that he shows the necessary
qualifications for release.54

Finally, he pointed out the use that could be made of the availability of parole
50 [1970] 4 C.C.C. 291.

1 Id. at 305.
62 Supra, note 41 at 396.
MaSupra, note 37 at 185.
54Id. at 185-86.
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in sentencing the "dangerous" offender. The sentencer could ensure by a long
sentence that the offender would not be released before he had been made
safe, but could nevertheless be assured that should the danger be eliminated
before the whole sentence had been served, he could be released and everyone would be happy. In this connection the Court pointed to Mabees5 where,
in upholding a precautionary sentence of five years imprisonment for indecent
assault on a child, the Court referred to the possibility of the Parole Board
releasing the offender according to periodic assessments of the danger of
doing so. A very recent example of this type of use of parole in sentencing is
Boomhower.56
The Ontario Court of Appeal's latest pronouncement on the point is in
Pearce r7 That was an appeal against a sentence of six years imprisonment
for conspiracy to traffic in a controlled drug. It was apparently argued that in
imposing such a severe sentence the trial judge had not shown sufficient concern for the rehabilitation of the offender. The majority disagreed:
He did not fail to take into account the possible rehabilitation of the appellant.

In considering the latter aspect of sentencing it is proper to take into account
that the appellant need only serve four years and one month of the sentence
imposed 5and that he will be eligible for parole in two years from the time of
sentence.

Dubin, J.A., in dissent thought that, in the circumstances, parole ought
not to be taken into account. He drew a distinction between rehabilitation
prospects apparent at trial (for the Court to deal with) and those which
might become apparent later (for the Parole Board to deal with).
The most recent appellate decision, this time by the Appellate Division
of the Alberta Supreme Court in McIntosh,59 indicates that the realist view is
spreading. In that case a sentence of three years for trafficking in a narcotic
was imposed on a Crown appeal, with numerous references to the Parole
Board as mitigator of severe sentences in the interests of rehabilitation.
To summarize the predominant realist position: In considering what
sentence to impose, the sentencer may take the availability of parole into
account and impose a longer sentence than he otherwise would have imposed,
not in order to support or subvert Parole Board policies, but in order to
better serve the aims of sentencing. Parole may be relevant in any of several
ways, but primarily it will be relevant to the aim of rehabilitation. In considering the effect of prolonged incarceration on the possibility of the offender
being rehabilitated, the sentencer can consider the fact that the Parole Board
is empowered to release the offender in the interests of his rehabilitation
before his time is up. Any similarity between this and a delegation of sentencing duties to the Parole Board is purely a product of the reader's imagination
and mine as well.
55 [1965] 3 0.0.0. 150 (Ont. C.A.).
56 (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 89 (Ont. CA.).
57 (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 369.
581d. at 370.
59 (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 33. No reference was made in this decision to a.much
older Alberta decision in the realist vein, R. v. Tews'(1926), 45 C.C.C. 116 (Alta. S.C.).
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To return to the point we were driving at earlier, it is clear that some
sentencers are taking parole into account and their sentences are longer as a
result. The fact that this practice is condoned by the Courts of Appeal of at
least three provincesc0 suggests that it is not a minor phenomenon. Furthermore, although the purist position is far from psychologically impossible to
carry into practice (much less difficult, one would think, than excluding
inadmissible evidence), it seems to me that where the realist position is
legitimate, it would be natural for sentencers to adopt it. This is because in
considering the 'appropriate' number of months or years of incarceration on
any of the criteria of appropriateness, any sentencer would want to know the
actual time to be spent incarcerated. There are several jobs to perform in
sentencing and all require advertence to the actual facts to be done to the
best of the sentencer's ability. If x years of incarceration is the appropriate
sentence for deterrence etc., would not a conscientious sentencer try to ensure
that that was what resulted?
In any event, we know that it is done sometimes. Some people have
clearly had their sentences lengthened on account of parole at the conscious
level. It is difficult to know but not difficult to surmise what occurs subconsciously. How many judges would not want to reconsider a sentence to a
term of imprisonment just passed if they were told that it was absolutely
certain that there was to be no parole? One's guess has to be that the practice
is fairly widespread, because judges are for the most part rational people. If
it were taken into account in one third of the prison sentences, it would have
the effect of lengthening more sentences than are shortened by parole. Even
if it were not that widespread, then just by chance many individual sentences
would be lengthened on account of parole but would not be shortened by it,
and this would of course be unfair to the individuals involved.
How much have sentences been increased? If we based our answer
solely on what has been said in the reported cases the average increase would
be rather huge. The deductions made by the Courts of Appeal where judges
improperly took parole into account represent increases, on the average, of
79.2 percent. 61 In order to counteract that, if it were done in every case,
62
parole would have to reduce time served by 44.2 percent just to keep up
and, as we have seen, it falls far short of doing so. Of course, one cannot
consider four cases decided over a five-year period to be a representative
sample when over 250,000 sentences of imprisonment were passed in that
same period. But looking at it theoretically, this 79.2 percent increase would
need to have occurred in only 13.9 percent of the cases to have obliterated
00 Perhaps four, if Manitoba still holds to the view expressed in R. v. Skibo (1931),
55 C.C.C. 124 (Man. C.A.).
0
1 In Wilmott, supra, note 37, the increase was from 8 to 12 years or 50 percent;
in Holden, supra, note 41, from 6 to 14 months or 133.3 percent; in Heck, supra, note
45, from 21A to 5 years or 100 percent; in Coffey, supra, note 48, from 3 to 4 years
or 33.3 percent.
62 179.2-100 x 100 = 44.2 percent
179.2
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TABLE 5
Frequency of Various Increases in Sentence
Length Necessary to Totally Counteract
the Effect of Parole on Time Spent in Prison
Percentage increase
in length of
sentence

100
50

33.3
25
20
16.67
14.28
12.5
11

Increase expressed
in months [or years]

Percentage frequency
of increase necessary
to counteract effect
of parole

1 to 2
2 to 3

11
22

3 to 4
4to 5
5 to 6
6 to 7
7 to 8
8 to 9
8 to 8.9

33
44
55
66
77
88
100

the effect of parole on time spent in prison,es - even if there were no increases in any other cases. A smaller increase, say of 50 percent (representing an increase, for example, of two to three months or years), would need
to have occurred in 22 percent of the cases, and so on as illustrated in
Table 5.

The possibilities for a massive and over-compensating expansion in the
net lengths of sentences are virtually limitless. For example, one judge increases a sentence in view of the availability of parole without saying so
(unconsciously or deliberately) and, in the legitimate interest of uniformity
of sentences06 4 other judges follow suit so that a new threshhold is established.
Or a general amplification is effected through a change in attitude by judges
to the severity of any given term of months or years. Initially this is a
deliberate response to parole but judges soon become habituated' 5 and
amplification is piled onto amplification. Over the years a quite fantastic

escalation might result.
One must confess to a certain dissatisfaction with this type of reasoning,
but there is really not much else to go on. Empirical study of sentencing
63

A decrease of 9.9 percent is counteracted by an increase of

9

100-9.9

x 100 = 11.0

percent. An increase of 79.2 percent would therefore only have to take place in

1.0'79.2
x 100 = 13.9 percent of the cases to counteract a decrease of 9.9 percent in 100 percent
of the cases.
64 For the requirement to promote uniformity, see, R. v. Baldhead, [1966] 4 C.C.C.
18 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. O'Neill (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 276 (Nfld. S.C.); R. v. Mikkelson
(1973), 14 C.C.C. (2d) 255 (Sask. CA.); R. v. Spencer (1973), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 29
(N.S.S.C.); R. v. Jones (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 31 (P.E.I.S.C.).
65
In much the same way that we all become habituated to obeying the law. See,
e.g., F. E. Zimring and G. Hawkins, Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control
(Chicago: University of Chi. Press, 1973) at 84-87.
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practice over the years might seem useful at first thought, but apart from the
usual difficulties of statistical gaps, there are numerous problems: the increasing use of alternatives to short terms of imprisonment, changing offence
and penalty structures, changing attitudes towards crime and crimes, changing
patterns of offence commission. All of these would affect sentencing and
disguise any effect parole was having. Furthermore, we have had something
very like parole for almost as long as sentencing statistics have been kept so
it would be difficult to locate appropriate points on which to concentrate
study. Nonetheless, such a study has been undertaken and the inconclusive
results will be found in Appendix B.
This subject remains, unfortunately, largely a matter for intuition. There
is no question that sentences would be shorter if conditional release on parole
were abolished. Would they be more than 11 percent shorter? I have no
doubt, but the reader may differ.
C. THE PAINS OF PAROLE
The original object of relative indeterminancy of prison sentences was
the control of prisoner behaviour within the institution. At first it was negative,
aimed merely at the prevention of misconduct, much like the criminal law or
modem statutory remission. Release on 'ticket-of-leave' would be delayed if
offences were committed. It was Alexander Maconochie who, in the early
1840's at Norfolk Island's penal colony, first introduced a positive element.
Release on ticket-of-leave became partly dependent on good conduct as well,
through the mechanism of a system of 'marks'. Maconochie could more accurately be called the 'father of earned remission' than the 'father of parole',
at least as those terms are understood today. Anyway, according to the predominant aetiological theories of the era, criminality was a species or a
symptom of immorality in general, a result in the more hopeful cases of
defective moral upbringing. Thus it was, neatly enough, that prison discipline
could itself have a reformative effect, because reform did not mean "learning
a trade" but rather moral reform. To English aristocrats of the 1840's this
meant the learning of self-discipline. So Maconochie's system was constructed
to reward and thereby encourage "good ordinary behaviour, as diligence,
sobriety, obedience, honesty, fidelity, zeal, or the like". 66 In other words
Maconachie's system combined reform and discipline, the former coming
as a consequence of the latter.
There must be few who cling to such notions of causation today and
fewer still who believe that such qualities, if absent, can be cultivated in
prison. Nevertheless, their relevance has persisted into the modem parole
system. Parole is now used, at least in part, to promote rehabilitation by
'encouraging' the prisoner to take part in programmes, and success at rehabilitation is judged by elements of 'attitude' such as those mentioned by
Maconachie. For instance, in the First Annual Report of the National Parole
0OJ.V. Barry, Alexander Maconochie of Norfolk Island (Oxford: Oxford Univ.

Press, 1958) at 246.
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Board under "Parole Preparation and Selection" one finds: "Inmates are
informed that in order to be considered for parole they must demonstrate a
sincere intention to be law-abiding" (my emphasis).67 And further on under
"factors that the Board considers relevant" there are, among others
(c)the inmate's total personality as it reflects the possibility that he may cause
harm to society;
(e) the effort that the inmate has made in the institution to improve himself and
is likely to make when released;
(f) the inmate's response to the treatment and training program in the institution
and his general industry, conduct, behaviour and attitude;
of his own problem and his willingness to attempt
(g) the inmate's understanding
68
to overcome it;
(my emphasis)

In the second report (1960) we read: "the main test for parole is

whether or not the applicant seems to have changed his attitude and sincerely
intends to reform." And some new factors are added: "the degree of maturity
and of insight gained" and "the impressions, assessments, representations,
and recommendations received". 69 The former Chairman made pronouncements of this nature from time to time: "Parole is a matter of giving a man
a chance to reform if he seems to deserve it and of helping those who want to
help themselves.. ." (my emphasis). 7 Ontario officials inform inmates that
71

"general conduct and attitude within the institution are taken into account1
in parole deliberations.

So, though parole is not now normally justified as a behaviour controlling
mechanism, it is inevitable with such selection components that it would
operate as one. It need not, of course, have been this way. There is nothing
which makes it conceptually impossible for parole to have no effect on institutional behaviour. It could do so if it concerned itself solely with matters
falling outside of the prisoner's power, outside of the prison context. Indeed,
the state of the art suggests that there is really nothing which goes on in
prison which could assist a parole board in deciding (for either of the proor "the protection of society") whether
fessed main purposes of7rehabilitation
2
or when to grant parole.

6

7 At

8.

S68 d. at 9.
69
At 1 and 2.
7
DT.G. Street, quoted (beneath Goethe) at the front of the Annual Report for
1967. A more complete statement of the former Chairman's views (he retired at the
end of 1973) can be found in (1965), 7 Can. J.Corr. 283 at 284;
The main test for parole is whether or not the applicant seems to have changed
his attitude and sincerely intends to live a law-abiding life. This is necessarily a
matter of judgment based on a complete study of the various reports received on
each individual. The Board considers [among other things] .. .personality and
mentality, conduct, industry, behaviour, attitude and progress in the institution
*.. whether he has matured and achieved insight into his problem...
71 Binnie, supra, note 2.at 122.
72
See, below, text accompanying notes 95-98.
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However, this is not the road taken by parole boards here or elsewhere.
As a consequence there are many things within the prisoner's control, or at
least which he and others would naturally believe were within his control,
which the NPB apparently takes into account in the parole decision and we
have outlined them above. The result of this is to make the prisoner's life
even more miserable than it is already. For beyond the ordinary fear and
anxiety which we all experience from the threat of unpleasantness as a sancdon for rule-breaking (and which the prisoner also experiences from the
threat of loss of remission or "privileges" for misconduct), the parole system
brings with it an additional special sort of anxiety, a product not of the
severity of the sanction but of the nature of the rules. In order to avoid loss
of remission, etc. the prisoner knows (fairly well") what he must do and
not do, just as non-prisoners know what to do and not to do to avoid entanglement with the criminal law. And it bears emphasizing that in each of
these cases it is the doing and not the being of something that matters. But
parole criteria are so vague and so all-embracing, encompassing as they do
the prisoner's total personality, that their impact is quite different. A vastly
increased level of anxiety is the concomitant of the vastly increased number
of situations in which the possibility of doing something wrong and punishable, or of exposing one's personality as unworthy, arises. This leads inevitably to a further result of parole based on current criteria, the indignity
and humiliation of the constant inauthenticity the prisoner must maintain in
order not to spoil his chances for parole. At all costs and no matter what
the provocation, he must avoid giving offence to anyone in a position of
the slightest authority who might therefore influence the parole decision.
Remember the factors: "impressions, assessments, representations and recommendations received".7 4 Finally, just as vagueness in penal statutes excessively
limits our freedom by rendering the parameters of permissible conduct un-

73 As with the criminal law, there are many grey areas in disciplinary rules. See
Jackson, supra, note 26 at 3-16.
74 In his study of the parole boards of four American states, "Some Consequences
of a Parole System for Prison Management" in D. J. West (ed), The Future of Parole
(London: Duckworth, 1972), Keith Hawkins found at 115 that
Though parole boards possess the authority to override the advice or recommendations of prison staff, the latter are by no means powerless to influence
decisions. The major part of the report available to the parole board, comprising
evaluations and assessments of the individual's career in prison, is supplied by
the staff of the institutions. The only contact board members have with inmates
at the hearing may last no more than ten or fifteen minutes: otherwise they have
to depend for their knowledge of the prisoner on what they are told by others.
This ubiquity of authority will, of course, also effect an ampication of the prisoner's
anxiety and fear. Goffman called it "an authority system of the echelon kind":
:. . any member of the staff has certain rights to discipline any member of the
inmate class, thereby markedly increasing the probability of sanction ... Given
echelon authority and regulations that are diffuse, novel, and strictly enforced,
we may expect inmates, especially new ones, to live with chronic anxiety about
breaking the rules and in fear of the consequence of breaking them . . . staying
out of trouble is likely to require persistent conscious effort.
"On the Characteristics of Total Institutions: The Inmate World" in D. R. Cressy
(ed.), The Prison: Studies in Institutional Organization and Change (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1961) at 43-44.
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known,75 the same is true of prisoners and parole. Indeed, it is much worse.
"Attitude" and "general conduct" are big words. They entail a whole-life
view of the prisoner. Everything is relevant and therefore every public
moment (of which there are many in prison) is crucial.
Even if parole were completely divorced from institutional behaviour
there would still remain what for many is its worst aspect.
The useful fiction that parole is merely one part of an overall sentence
notwithstanding, there is a fundamental difference between being on parole
and not being on parole even under the same sentence. It is the difference
between being free and being locked behind bars. By introducing a substantial
element of indeterminancy into prison sentences, the parole system makes it
impossible for the prisoner to know with any certainty when he will again be
free. He experiences the paralysis of being unable to plan for the future. His
freedom is beyond his knowing or control. Whether uncertainty is more effective than certainty in controlling behaviour is a debate into which I do not
wish to enter here. 76 It suffices for now to point out its incompatability with
a prisoner's dignity and peace of mind.
Anxiety, fear, loss of dignity, excessively limited freedom, uncertainty
of one's future - these are the pains a parole system brings with it, and
they must be justified.
It would be no answer at all to the foregoing to show that the prisoners
themselves do not consider the parole system to operate against their own
interests. In the context of their daily lives parole (for those not yet denied it)
offers the prospect of earlier release, earlier, that is, than the expiry of the
sentence pronounced by the court (no matter that a component of that sentence was this same prospect of earlier release). The pains of parole are
after all a product of the overwhelming desire for earlier release, and its
prospect must therefore be a forceful element of most prisoners' affective
75 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, of Harvard

University Press, 1971) at 239:
. . . if the precept of no crime without a law is violated, say by statutes being
vague and imprecise, what we are at liberty to do is likewise vague and imprecise.
The boundaries of our liberty are uncertain. And to the extent that this is so,
liberty is restricted by a reasonable fear of its exercise.
76The following observation of Zebulon R. Brockway, one-time warden of the
famous Elmira Reformatory toward the end of the last century, suggests that uncertainty may have a double-edged nature:
The indeterminateness of the sentence breeds discontent, breeds purposefulness,
and prompts to a new exertion. Captivity, always irksome, is now increasingly so
because of the uncertainty of its duration.
(Quoted in Mitford, supra, note 33 at 81-82.) Of course Brockway was concerned here

with the catalysing effect of uncertainty on the prisoner's efforts to rehabilitate himself.
On the effect of indeterminacy, E. H. Sutherland and D. R. Cressey in Criminology
(9th ed. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974) have observed at 591:

Suffering on the part of prisoners is increased by indeterminate sentences and
parole. Most prisoners would prefer sentence of a fixed term in prison plus a fixed
term on parole to the agony of indeterminancy. Some would even prefer a long
term fixed in advance to a short term accompanied by a period of worry and anxiety while they await a decision or 'setting' by the parole board.
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responses to parole. One is therefore surprised to learn how widely among

prisoners it is recognized that the net effect of parole is to produce suffering.
When Lois James asked 238 prisoners in Ontario penitentiaries what
they thought was the effect on them "of knowing there is a chance of parole",
of those who answered in emotional (as opposed to behavioural) terms, 31.9
percent (44 out of 138) said that it "causes worry and anxiety, wondering
if he will make it or after making it, waiting for it...
'shake rough time'"
or that it "causes
depression,
bitterness,
and
sometimes
violence
when inmate
77
is refused."
James also found that when asked "What is considered when granting
parole?", inmates placed the greatest emphasis on behaviour in the institution, giving a high priority to "how well the inmate got along with staff".
Finally, in response to the question "What is your opinion of the National
Parole Board", unfavourable comments outnumbered favourable comments
by 111 to 92.
Susan Binnies asked a similar question of 182 prisoners in Ontario provincial institutions, but in this case the favourable comments outnumbered the
unfavourable by 53 to 31. However, when background information was added
in it was found that "favourable responses were given proportionately more
often by those with a high interest in obtaining parole, by less educated inmates, and by those who had never had parole".79 Binnie thought this might
be explained by variation in prisoner "willingness to use critical terms in the
interview situation". 0 Obviously, another explanation might lie in the ability
to pinpoint the source of one's anxiety. As in the James study, with respect
to factors important in getting parole, a very high emphasis was placed on
behaviour in the institution ("trying to keep out of trouble and from getting
any kind of punishment") and a substantial number rated as important trying to give a good impression and being on good terms with the rehabilitation
staff.
Useful and illuminating as these raw figures might be, they. cannot bring
the impact of the system home to non-prisoners nearly as well as the following
first hand accounts of the system in operation:
Responses by inmates of Ontario penitentiaries to the question: "How
are the inmates here affected by knowing that there is a chance of parole?" 81 :
"Many really worry. Hold over their heads like blackmair.
"It's always in your mind like a fantasy - you're always aware of it. Your
spirits are higher until you are turned down, when you become very depressed,
feeling you weren't done right by. You become antagonistic".
77 James, supra, note 2 at 62 ff. The other 68.2 percent had positive things to say
of the sort: "Gives the inmates hope - something to look forward to. Makes them
happy."
78
Supra, note 2 at 31-32.
tOld, at 31.
so Id.
8
l James, supra, note 2 at 62-63.
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'Too many people cutting each others throats over parole!'.
"Some go to extremes. They rat on other guys to make themselves look better".
"He goes into a shell and can't act naturally".
82
An account of a Connecticut parole hearing

"They discuss his addiction. Johnson grows more sullen. He is past caring about
making a good impression.'He may not know how. But how do you judge the
importance of appearance, of manner? A man might blow it with a truculent
manner, or a sneer - eight months of freedom for the satisfaction of a sneer.
Johnson was nervous before the hearing. 'I'm wondering whether I'll say too
much or not enough,' he had said, 'whether I'll put my foot in my mouth. If
they ask is this yellow wall blue, I'll say of course it's blue. rll say anything I
think they want me to say if they're getting ready to let me go'."

A prisoner of Frontera Prison, California:8s
"... the constant mental torture of never really knowing how long you'll be
here. The indeterminate sentence structure gives you no peace of mind and
absolutely noihing to work for."

Four prisoners of San Quentin Prison, California:s 4
"The people on the board are God and they know it. They have you in their
hands. They control your salvation, your heaven and your hell. Once a year you
stand before that God and they decide whether or not you stay in hell for
another. And that God is unpredictable. That is the way it is. I just don't know
how to get around it. You never really know what they want."
"I was sent to prison for possession of marijuana. So far I have done two and a
half years. The last time I went to the board they asked me if I believed in
legalizing marijuana. Now how am I supposed to answer that? If I say 'no' they
will just assume that I am lying; if I say 'yes' they will think that I intend to
continue to break the law when I get out and that I am not rehabilitated. I told
them that I thought the penalties were too severe but that I didn't know whether
it should be legalized or not. They denied me a year."
"For three years I was the model prisoner. I had perfect work reports. I
graduated from high school and was taking college courses. I didn't have any
disciplinary infractions except for one or two very minor things. I stayed away
from the militants. I went regularly to therapy programs - group therapy,
Alcoholics Anonymous, and even a Yokefellow group. So when I went to the
board after three years I felt positive I would get a date. The Adult Authority
shot me down a year. They said that they didn't feel I was sincere. They said
that I was just con-wise and was playing a game with them. Now I don't know
what to do. If I get any writeups or stop going to therapy, they will take this
as proving that I was faking it before. But if I don't do anything new, they will
just say the same thing next year."
"An individual leaves his individuality and any pride he may have behind these
walls... No one walks into the board room with head up. This just isn't donel
82

Donald Jackson, "Parole Board", Life, Vol. 69, No. 2 (1970) at 60.
Quoted in D. A. Ward and G. G. Kassebaum, Women's Prison (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 1966) at 20.
Too much should not be made of the word "indeterminate". The California system, like our own, is only semi-indeterminate. Not. all sentences are life sentences.
Most have minima and maxima, though they tend to be somewhat further apart than
Canadian minima and maxima. This is merely a matter of degree.
84 Quoted by E. 0. Wright in "San Quentin Prison: A Portrait of Contradictions"
in E. 0. Wright .(ed.), The Politics of Punishment, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973)
at 127-30.
83
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Guys lie to each other, but if a man gets a parole from the prison, Fay, it means
that he crawled into that room.. . No black will leave this place if he has any
violence in his past until they see that thing in his eyes. And you can't fake it,
resignation - defeat, it must be stamped clearly across the face."
85
An account of a California parole hearing:

" . . the members of the board were looking for indications that the prisoner
felt remorse for his crime. When one prisoner responded to the question, 'Do
you regret that you committed the burglary?' by saying, 'I didn't do it,' the head
of the hearing told him: 'We are not a court that is going to retry your case.
We must assume that you are guilty of the crime. You are only hurting yourself
by denying it.' After the prisoner left the room, one of the members of the board
remarked: 'This man obviously doesn't feel the slightest remorse for what he
did. He is hostile and bitter towards the prison. It seems to me that he needs
more time to think things over'."

Two California prisoners:86
"From the vindictive guard who sets out to build a record against some individual
to the parole board, the indeterminate sentence grants Corrections the power to
play God with the lives of prisoners."
"Don't put in a shiny modem hospital; free us from the tyranny of the indeterminate sentence!"

There are many other things wrong with parole which I do not propose
to discuss here. Two that deserve brief mention, though, are the in camera
nature of the proceedings, and the wide discretion conferred on the paroling
authorities.
For all the fictions about parole being just another way of serving a
prison sentence, parole decisions have profound effects on the lives of
thousands of individuals. They radically affect the meaning of the sentence of
the court. Yet they are made in private. The consequence of this is that we
are left in utter confusion about an essential aspect of the harshest part of the
penal system. We just do not know how long people are being sent away for.
As a result, one of the purposes of a public trial is vitiated.
The problem with wide discretion in decision making is that it is always
liable to abuse through conscious and unconscious prejudice and motives
which are irrelevant to the purpose to be served. These need not be so obvious
as the political and racial biases with which the American parole boards have
been charged. It can be as subtle as the insinuation of vengeful and retributive
feelings and class prejudices about certain crimes and criminals into the decision maker's calculus. It is not hard to see how such feelings, the vindication
of which no one has ever suggested as a legitimate purpose of the parole system, can find
expression in such ambiguous criteria as "attitude" and "general
conduct". 8 7
85 Id. at 130.
80 Quoted in Mitford, supra, note 33 at 83, 87.
87

See, generally, American Friends Service Committee, supra, note 33 at 124-44;
Hawkins, supra, note 74 at 113; Sutherland and Cressey, supra, note 76 at 590; Wright,
supra, note 84 at 97-99.
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THE JUSTIFICATION OF PAROLE

Like the seasons, justifications for parole come and go with reassuring
regularity. I propose to look at five which cover the field with reasonable
comprehensiveness.
1.

Parole and Rehabilitation
"Rehabilitation" (or "reformation") has long been the main rallying cry
for parole.88 The word is used in a very narrow sense to mean the character
transformation from criminality to law-abidingness, and the ways in which
parole is said to perform the transformation are basically two. They represent
what might be called the "positive" and "negative" aspects of prison rehabilitation.

On the positive side, parole, or the prospect of early release, is supposed
to operate as an inducement to the prisoner to rehabilitate himself and in that
way attain his freedom. The roots of this are, as was seen above, in the marks
system of Alexander Maconochie. For Maconochie and his contemporaries
the idea was rehabilitation through self-discipline. More recently, though, it
has been rehabilitation through participation in prison programmes, be they
individual or group counselling, vocational or academic training, or the like,
which are intended to transform prisoners into law-abiding citizens. The
Fauteux Report said:
The prospect of parole stimulates the inmate to derive maximum benefits from
the facilities provided by the prison as preparation for parole, i.e. the educational, vocational, religious, recreational and other services furnished by the
institution.

88

89

Prime Minister Laurier, on introducing the 1899 Bill to provide for the Conditional Liberation of Penitentiary Convicts said in part (House of Commons Debates,
1899 at 9602):
There are two classes of men in the prisons of the country; there are the men
who are hopeless criminals and there are other men who are the victims of accident rather than of criminal instincts, and it is to these men to which this Bill is
to be applied with the design to giving them a chance to redeem their characters.
It is questionable whether a jail or a penitentiary is a place of improvement for
a man placed in confinement there. Very often a man goes into a penitentiary
who is not a criminal, but he is made a criminal by the associations which in
jail become unavoidable.
The Fauteux Report, supra, note 7 at 51:
Parole is a well recognized procedure which is designed to be a logical step in
the reformation and rehabilitation of a person who has been convicted of an
offence and, as a result, is undergoing imprisonment.,
The First Annual Report of the National Parole Board, supra, note 67 at 3:
The purpose of parole is to aid in the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender having due regard, of course, for the protection of the public.
The Ouimet Report, supra, note 8 at 330:
Parole is a treatment-oriented correctional measure...
8
9Supra, note 7 at 52, echoed in 1965 by the Chairman of the NPB, supra, note
68 at 284: "The possibility of parole provides a strong incentive to an inmate to gain
maximum benefit from the prison facilities and to change his attitude towards crime."
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The prospect of early release is to operate as an incentive. The concept
is one of punishment and reward and very little else. We will call this the
"incentive" thesis for short. It is "positive" because it rests on the belief that
through a course of study or training or counselling within the prison a change
in the prisoner will occur (other than, one supposes, through fear of having
to undergo the process again) which will make it less likely that further
crimes will be committed by him, and that this will happen whatever the
motive for his participation.
On the negative side, it is said that whatever benefits one might derive
from prison programmes there usually comes a time when, to quote the
Parole Act (section 10(1) (a)(i)),
the inmate has derived the maximum benefit from imprisonment,

and, so the theory goes, further imprisonment will be deleterious, while release under supervision will be helpful to the prisoner's rehabilitation. It is
at this moment that the prisoner should be paroled and it is the Parole Board's
job to ascertain when this moment has arrived in each case and act.90 We will
call this the "peak period" thesis. It is negative because it emphasizes the
prevention of deterioration through the use of timely release.
These theories will appeal to some and seem fantastic to others. Fortunately, they raise empirical questions which have been fairly thoroughly
investigated.
The best way to test the correctional efficacy of a parole system would be
to compare the rate of recidivism of prisoners released under such a system
(not necessarily on parole, but just under a system which provided for parole)
with that of prisoners released under a system which did not provide for
00 The Fauteux Report, supra,note 7 at 52-53:

Experienced institutional officers have frequently observed: 'This inmate has had
enough. If released in the near future he will probably go straight. If confined
much longer, he'll be no use to himself or to society.' A former prisoner, released after serving ten years of a twenty-year sentence, expressed his feelings
as follows:
"One of the most difficult and I might even add painful phases in prison life is
at that period when the prisoner comes to the self shocking knowledge that the
things he has been doing all his life have been stupid and his feelings about going
straight at this time are very sincere. And very definitely if Society gave him a
chance at this psychological moment he would make good. But since Canada
does not have a parole system that can catch men at such times, especially second and third timers, then he goes on from day to day living in a hopeless hope
until bitterness sets in and he becomes lost. I often wonder how many real criminals are made and violent type crimes thought of, planned and committed through
just such bitterness in the heart formed in and by such a mental situation."
A memorandum submitted by the staff of one of Canada's federal penitentiaries
gives this view of the same subject:
"This group desire to record their opinion that a time arrives during the period of
incarceration of almost every inmate which is the most appropriate time for his
release. Continued imprisonment after this time usually results in'discouragement,
bitterness, cynicism and an anti-social attitude. Penitentiary staff members, through
daily contact with each inmate, are in a position to. draw to .the attention of the
remission Service the fact that an inmate is ripe for release." .
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parole. That has not been done, nor is it likely to be done. What has been
done is the testing of the relative performances of those released on parole
and those discharged after normal expiration of their sentence, i.e. those denied parole - all within the same system. It is implicit in the incentive thesis
at least, that those paroled will have been rehabilitated to a greater extent than those denied parole, because parole is granted as a reward for
(and an inducement to) rehabilitative participation. As for the peak period
thesis, one might first suppose that the same would not be the case because
if the selection process were working perfectly the decision to deny parole
would be as much the best decision for those denied parole as would be the
opposite decision for those granted parole. That is, the thesis of the peak
period supposes that if an inmate has not reached the peak period, it is best
for his rehabilitation that he stay put. The problem is that as there is no third
alternative (as opposed to releasing him or keeping him in custody), while a
decision to release a prisoner must mean that his "reform and rehabilitation
...
will be aided by the grant of parole", 91 a decision not to release may mean
that his reform etc. will be aided by further imprisonment. But it may also
mean that his release would "constitute an undue risk to society" 92 even
though his chances for rehabilitation are excellent, or that it makes no difference to his rehabilitation whether he is released or not. In the latter two
cases the decision to keep the prisoner in prison would not enhance his
chances of rehabilitation. In this way, the structure of decision-making would
lead us to expect that if the peak period thesis were correct and being properly
applied parolees would, as a group, benefit more from being paroled than dischargees from being kept in prison.
And it is in this way that Irvin Waller's Men Released From Prison suggests strongly that the rehabilitative efficacy not only of Canada's parole system, but also of the two theses just mentioned, is illusory. His study concerned
423 men released from penitentiaries in Ontario during 1968, 210 released on
parole and 213 discharged on the expiry of their sentences. A two year
follow-up found 65 percent of the dischargees but only 44 percent of the
parolees re-arrested. However, the important point is that this differential
performance in absolute terms was due solely to the selection process. The
good risks (those who on the basis of age, penal record and personality were
relatively less likely to recidivate no matter what was done to them) were
paroled and the bad risks were discharged. When different risks were taken
into account, it was found that parole had no effect except that, other things
being equal, a parolee would be arrested slightly later than a dischargee.
Waller attributes this to the parole supervisor's "help with employment". 93
But there was no lasting effect whatsoever, nothing that could remotely be
called rehabilitation.
Of course a study such as this need not mean that parole cannot rehabilitate prisoners. An alternative explanation would be that the current administrators are inept at the operation of an essentially sound system. However
9

1Parole Act, supra, note 6, s. 10(1) (a) (ii).
s. 10(1) (a) (iii).
Supra, note 2 at 190.

92 Id.,
93
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appealing this explanation may be to those who believe that if only enough
time, money and effort are devoted to an objective it can be achieved, it is
extremely unlikely that it is the correct explanation. The premises upon which
parole is claimed to be correctively efficacious have been carefully tested in
many contexts and have yet to be verified empirically.
The incentive thesis rests on the premise that the better a person behaves
in prison, the more he involves himself in prison programmes, the less likely
he is to commit further offences when he is released. However, the evidence
just does not bear this out. Study after study has failed to show any relationship between what one does in prison and what one does afterwards (criminally speaking) when the initial risk differences in the participants are controlled for.0 4 Nor should this be surprising. Whatever one's favourite aetiological theory, it is very unlikely that any significant changes (apart from changes
in one's attitude to prison and the chances and consequences of getting
caught) can be effected in the context of the prison environment, whether they
be changes in personality or material or social circumstances. Nor does common
sense suggest that behaviour behind bars is at all likely to be a reliable indicator of behaviour in freedom.
The peak period thesis stands on even less stable footing. To prove this
thesis, one would have to show first that a prisoner's subsequent criminality
was affected by the length of time he spent in prison. This would be exceedingly difficult to do on the evidence as it now stands.9 5 But even success in this
regard would not prove the thesis, for it would merely mean that there were
indeed better times to release an individual prisoner in the interests of rehabilitation. It would not prove that there were best times. That is to say, while
a time element might be useful (if it existed) in deciding which prisoners
should be kept in custody longer than others, and which shorter than others
(or as long or short as possible) it could not of itself indicate for any prisoner
or group of prisoners the existence of a point before which release ought not
and after which it ought to occur in the interests of rehabilitation, viz. the
existence of a peak period.
04

See, for instance, R. G. Hood & R. F. Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) at 186-214; J. Robison & G. Smith The Effectiveness of
Correctional Programs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 17 Crime and Delinquency
67; V. O'Leary & D. Glaser, "The Assessment of Risk in Parole Decision Making" in
West, supra, note 74 at 135 ff.
OUSee id.; also, R. F. Sparks, "Research on the Use and Effectiveness of Probation,
Parole and Measures of After-care" in the Report of the European Committee on
Crime Problems (Council of Europe, 1970) at 263.
There is one study which tends to support a time nexus, an unpublished Ph.D.
thesis by Donald L. Garrity, The Effects of IncarcerationUpon Adjustment and Estimation of Optimum Sentence, referred to in "The Prison as a Rehabilitation Agency" in
Cressey, supra, note 74. This was a study of 1,265 Washington parolees conducted in
the early 1950's and in it a connection is shown between length of imprisonment and
parole violation for some types of offenders, though not for others. However, it should
be noted that the study was concerned with parole violation, not recidivism, i.e. whether
the "treatment" was completed, not whether it effected a cure. The criterion of failure
was the issuance of a parole violation warrant which need not have entailed criminal
misbehaviour and the follow-up period was not uniform for each subject.
Waller found length of time spent in prison to be completely unrelated to rearrest: supra, note 2 at 191.
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Finally, even if such a point could be identified, this would not in itself
justify the parole selection process. For that it would have to be shown that
the point, like the ripening point of some vegetable or fruit, could not be
determined beforehand but only through careful observation of each case. Of
course, as no one has demonstrated the existence of a peak period, the question of when it could be ascertained has not been investigated. But the evidence with other variables of post-release conduct is all against this last link
in the thesis. All of what can be known of what an offender is likely to do
after he is released from prison can be known before he is imprisoned. 96
There is no justification for a "wait-and-see" policy, for a selection process

which keeps prisoners dangling throughout their period of custody on the
ground that their "progress" is being gauged. If there are people who "respond" best to shorter or longer periods of incarceration, they can be identified at the sentencing stage. 97 This of course would have the benefit of eliminating not only their own uncertainty but that of the judges and the rest of
us as well.
The selection process, then, cannot be supported on the basis of rehabilitation. What about the process of compulsory supervision? Waler's study is
only the most recent to indicate that, however good it is for the soul, and
whatever short run effects it might have, it has no long run effect on criminality. This finding applies to casework in general, of whatever quality and intensity. 98 The only thing that coercion, in the form of threatened revocation,
adds, is mutual distrust and the unnecessary imprisonment of parolees returned to prison by overcautious supervisors.
2.

Paroleand PrisonDiscipline

The maintenance of prison discipline usually only figures in official justifications of parole in order to be denounced 99 The exception is the "encouragement" of participation in prison programmes in the interests of re96 Except for that which can be known after the prisoner is released, but before he
is re-arrested. Wailer found that a number of "post-release variables" such as unemployment, fighting and drinking were significantly related to re-arrest: see id. at 172-80.
97 See Hood & Sparks, supra, note 94; Robison & Smith, supra, note 94; O'Leary &
Glaser, supra, note 94; Sparks, supra, note 95; Garrity, supra, note 95; Waller, supra,
note 2.
98 See Joel Fischer, Is Casework Effective? A Review (1973), 18 Social Work 5;
Robison & Smith, supra, note 94.
99
See, e.g., the Goldenberg Report, supra, note 25 at 40:
Parole is not a means of managing prisons. Submissions to the Committee
generally avoided making a direct suggestion that parole be used as a method
of managing prisons although some proposals have come very close to it. We
believe that parole should not be used to offset institutional deficiencies, nor to
eliminate overcrowding. It is not the role of the parole authority to solve prison
discipline problems by releasing troublesome inmates ...
Parole is not a reward. The Committee supports the position that the parole
authority should not grant parole as a reward for good behaviour or assistance to
the administration or for any similar reason. (emphasis in original)
The Fauteux Report, supra, note 7 at 51, did add, though, almost as an afterthought, "The possibility of parole may be an incentive to good conduct in the institution".
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habilitation." 0° Of course, this exception in official doctrine indicates that the
control potential of parole has not been lost on administrators. And reliance
on "attitude' as a parole criterion' 01 has probably been sufficient to satisfy
those with a more pragmatic turn of mind that parole has been put to good
disciplinary use. In fact, it is probably the control objectives which predominate when they and the rehabilitation objectives conflict, which must frequently occur. This much at least is indicated by Keith Hawkins' study of
four American parole boards.' 0 2 Good institutional behaviour becomes the
threshold requirement for release because of the effect on prisoner "morale"
which the release of a "troublemaker" would have, whether or not it was indicated for rehabilitative purposes.
It is clear that parole cannot serve both masters as well as it could serve
either one. Only the simplistic "classical" explanation of criminality discussed
earlier allows institutional behaviour and rehabilitation to so conveniently
coalesce in "attitude". Perhaps it is an awareness of this and of parole's lack
of rehabilitative effect that led the Hugessen Committee' 0s (of which Irvin
Waller was a member) to emphasize the control aspect of parole, among
others, to the virtual exclusion of the rehabilitative aspect. Under this Committee's recommended scheme, an inmate would be released on parole, not
when rehabilitation would be enhanced, but whenever eligible, unless (among
other things) 104 "his release at that time would have a substantially adverse

effect on institutional discipline". Parole is to serve this disciplinary function
and remission is to be abolished. Of course, the Committee starts from the
premise that parole is here to stay. If one starts rather from the premise that
parole must be justified, is there any reason to prefer it to remission as a
disciplinary device?
The Hugessen Committee preferred parole apparently because it was
considered potentially more severe a sanction than remission: "If time is the
currency of prisons, then parole is a more valuable coin than remission as it
100 See the previous section.
101 Naturally, this has also been justified on the basis of rehabilitation: attitude as
an index of reform or of reformability through release.
0
1 2 Supra, note 74.
03
1 Supra, note 20.
104 Id. at 33; the full text reads:
Whenever the board considers the release of an inmate who is eligible for parole,
it shall be the policy of the board to order his release, unless the board is of the
opinion that his release should be deferred because: (a) There is substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
and that as a result, there is a risk of serious harm to society; or
(b) his release at that time would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law; or
(c) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline;
or
(d) his continued correctional treatment, medical care or vocational or other
training in the institution will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a lawabiding life when released at a later date and no equivalent treatment or training
is available in the community.
This is a slight modification of §305.9 of the.American Law Institute Model
Penal Code Proposed Official Draft (1962).
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may affect not days or weeks, but months and years of prison time and does
so earlier in the sentence". 10 5 But, of course, so would corporal, or even capital, punishment be more severe. The question is whether the more severe
parole would be anymore effective than remission, and if that, then sufficiently
more effective to justify all the trouble it causes. And, as with sentencing itself, we will never know what is the appropriate (i.e. necessary) severity in
order to prevent any given offence until experiments are performed with varying degrees of severity. This has not been possible not only, as with sentencing,
because of the wide discretion and consequent variation in practice, but also
because there has been no systematic recording of the granting and withdrawing of remission. We cannot know even if anything like remission is
needed.106
All this aside, it is clear that we do not need a multimillion dollar parole
board to administer a remission system, no matter how severe its sanctions
(or vague its criteria). The means of controlling prison behaviour through
time are all present in the remission system. If that system needs adjustment,
the adjustment needed is minor, anyway not major enough to justify a change
in nomenclature. While parole is married to rehabilitation it cannot serve
the function of control as well as a thoroughgoing remission system. Divorced
from rehabilitation it is at worst an overly vague, severe and centralized remission system, and at best a good remission system.
3.

Paroleand Clemency
The Canadian parole system started life as a system primarily concerned
with the administration of "clemency" i.e. sentence adjustment on purely
humanitarian grounds.' 07 By the time of the Fauteux Report one can detect
105
106

Id.at 27.
Id. at 27-28:

In a modem penitentiary system the means of control both by positive motivation and negative sanction are more diversified and offer a wider scope to the
penitentiary authorities than was the case in the past. For minor offences such as
swearing at a correctional officer or minor contraband, there are many privileges
which can be withdrawn from an inmate ranging all the way from the right to
watch television in the evening to the right to earn a full day's salary for his
work. An inmate can be moved from one grade of payment to another. His
activities in clubs, discussion groups and sporting activities can be limited or
taken away altogether.
For more serious offences such as important contraband, refusal to obey orders
and minor skirmishes among inmates, there are more serious actions that can be
taken against the inmate such as disassociation or transfer to an institution with
a higher security rating and therefore more restrictions.
Any inmate who commits, within the penitentiary, an offence against the Criminal
Code such as an assault on a guard can and should be prosecuted in the ordinary
way before the courts.
10 7 The Prime Minister said, pithily, in 1899:
Here is a convict, a young man of good character, who may have committed a
crime in a moment of passion, or, perhaps, have fallen a victim to bad example
or the influence of unworthy friends. There is a good report of him while in confinement, and it is supposed that if he were given another chance, he would be
a good citizen. Under the Bill power is given to the Governor General to order
his liberation ...
(Supra, note 88 at 9600.)
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an ambivalence towards parole as clemency.10 8 Since the report official
opinion has definitely hardened against it.109 The Ouimet" 0 and Goldenberg,"
reports are both emphatically opposed to the inclusion of any element of
sentence-tampering in their conceptions of parole. This is more rhetoric than
anything else. The NPB has long used clemency considerations in administering parole." 2 The British were more frank about it when their system was
recommended: "It would incidentally also go some way to relieve the overcrowding of prisons". 1 3 Furthermore, it is the clemency aspect of parole
which appeals to those who have investigated the promise of rehabilitation
and have found it empty." 4
Of course, the key assumption behind parole as clemency, or any form
of humanitarian justification, is that parole confers a benefit on prisoners. The
"pains of parole" apart, what was found earlier with respect to parole and
sentence length bears repeating: it is clear that a good many sentences have

'o Supra, note 7 at 51-52. In the space of two pages one reads:
There has been in Canada a tendency to confuse two completely different ideas
in the field of corrections. One is parole. The other is clemency ...Clemency ...
has very little, if anything to do with reformation or rehabilitation . . . [1]n a
well designed system of corrections there should be few occasions for its use.
and
Parole . . .is a socially just procedure because it enables society to play an
auxiliary role in the readjustment of the individual who may have become a criminal party through shortcomings in society itself. It may serve as a proper
means of mitigating excessively severe punishments imposed under the influence
of aroused public emotions.
100 Right from the start, the NPB assured us, under "Policy of the Board", that
the Board was striving "to avoid any suggestion that parole involves mollycoddling inmates or the use of leniency or clemency"; First Annual Report of the National Parole
Board, supra, note 67 at 4.
l' Supra, note 8 at 330: "Parole is a treatment-oriented correctional measure, not
a sentence-correcting method. It is in no way aimed at reviewing the sentence of the
court."
I' Supra, note 25 at 40:
Parole is not clemency . ..This Committee feels that clemency considerations
should not be mixed with parole. They proceed from a philosophy completely
different from the one on which parole is based...
Parole is not amelioration, equalization or review of sentence. Review of
sentences for whatever reason is a function of appeal courts .. . (emphasis in
original)
112 It has always considered, e.g., "the nature and gravity of the inmate's offence'
First Annual Report of the NationalParole Board, supra, note 67 at 9. Furthermore, a
host of clemency-type considerations (e.g., "death in family", "extenuating circumstances in the offence") were disclosed to the Goldenberg Committee as matters which
were taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant parole before the normal
one-third of the sentence had expired: id. at 24-25. Any board using these factors in
this type of decision would also use them in ordinary parole decisions, whether it cared
to admit it or not.
113 Secretary of State for the Home Department, The Adult Offender (London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965) para. 8.
114 See, e.g., Waller, supra, note 2 at 16 where he includes as "valuable functions"
of parole "the relief of overcrowding" and "humanitarian considerations".
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been lengthened, not shortened, by parole, and there is evidence that on the
whole less time would be spent in prison if parole were done away with. It
would at least eliminate the guesswork. If still shorter terms were desired,
this could be achieved directly, openly, and relatively easily through sentencing legislation.
4.

Parole and the Protection of Society

The most powerful and complex arguments for parole have been made
under the rubric of "the protection of society".'15 The essence of them is this:
it is an important purpose of every sentence of imprisonment to protect the
public for the duration of the sentence from the criminal depredations of the
offender. Therefore, only those should be released before expiry of the sentence (for whatever reason - rehabilitation, as reward, humanitarianism)
who are not likely to commit further offences while on parole, and to ensure
this a careful selection process is necessary. Also necessary is supervision of
the parolee to better prevent his commission of further offences.
Of course, a key assumption of this position is that some benefit either
to the prisoners or to "society" is derived from the system of parole, either
through less overall time spent in prison or rehabilitation or whatever. This
point need not be reargued here. That apart, there are several fatal weaknesses in the position.
First, in the matter of practical application: How well can the NPB
predict who is and who is not going to commit an offence while on parole?
Its cancellation rate alone shows it to have been wrong over 18 percent of
the time.1 6 But cancellations represent only mistaken predictions of nonviolation. We have no way of knowing how many prisoners were denied
parole under the mistaken prediction that they were going to violate parole,
wrongfully condemned to serve out their full sentences (sentences which may
well have been lengthened because of the availability of parole). It is for this
reason that we cannot know whether the expensive selection process of the

115 Fauteux Report, supra, note 7 at 52:

[Parole] offers a means of protection to society from further criminal activity on
the part of released offenders;
T. G. Street, Chairman of the NPB 1959-1972, supra, note 70 at 284:
The dual purpose of parole is the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of society;
Ouimet Report, supra, note 8 at 330:
For society, [parole] offers immediate protection through a degree of surveillance
and control over the offender's behaviour, and long-term protection through a
reduced likelihood of recidivism;
Goldenberg Report, supra, note 25 at 43:
Parole is an aid to social control of offenders. One of the principles of this Report is that the core of parole is the protection of society. The parole system must
protect the members of society - and the offender himself - at each stage of
the process.
116 See note 30 and accompanying text.
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NPB is one whit
superior to purely random selection. We do not know the
"base rate"," 7 the rate of default that would occur if random selection were
used.
Parole prediction is still pretty much a matter of guesswork, and one
cannot help but admire the candour of the current Chairman of the NPB,
W. R. Outerbridge, in admitting (to a group of police chiefs, no less): "When
it comes to predicting future behaviour with accuracy, we would all appear
to be amateurs. This kind of prediction is even more difficult than predicting
future economic trends, political events or even housing and food costs"." 8
Accuracy aside, another question must be raised, that of how much protection is actually being purchased here. We have calculated that parolees
have served about 50.0 percent of their sentences and that this has resulted
in an average for them in time spent in prison of 33.9 percent. What we
should be asking is, what would happen if everyone were released 33.9 percent earlier than they are now, including the prisoners who are now denied
parole and are kept in prison until the expiry of their sentences?
Table 6 gives the lengths of the sentences of those denied parole between 1968 and 1972. As the cumulative percentages show, 44.5 percent
of them were serving sentences of less than 18 months and the "protection"
achieved by denying them the earlier release afforded parolees was less than
six months." 9 For 79.7 percent the protection lasted less than one year and
for 97.5 percent the protection lasted less than two years. Not an awful lot
of protection, that. Those who will commit crimes will, of course, do so
whether released two years later or earlier. Furthermore, many crimes will be
committed in prison, perhaps more than would be committed outside of
prison on account of the special circumstances of confinement; though, of
117
See D.M. Gottfredson, "Assessment and Prediction Methods in Crime and
Delinquency" in Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency. President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Appendix K (1967), reprinted in N.
Johnston, L. Savitz and M. E. Wolfgang, The Sociology of Punishment and Correction
(2nd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970) at 752:
The 'base rate' refers to the proportion of individuals in some population who fall
into a category which is to be predicted.... In order for a prediction method to
be useful, it must provide more information than that given by the base rate alone.
See, also, T. Grygier & 0. R. Porebski, Decision and Outcome: Studies in Parole
Prediction (1971), 13 Can. J. Corr. 133 at 135:
Ifa device to predict likelihood of parole success or failure isto serve as a guide
to the Board, it must be independent of itspolicy. At the moment, we can only
tell what risk is involved after a favourable decision of the Board has been made.
In that sense our method - which was restricted by circumstances beyond our
control and was the only one possible under the research contract - almost
forced us to single out the types of parolees who are at present released and
should be denied parole, instead of finding out which parolees, at present denied
parole should be released earlier. [emphasis in original]
118 Quoted in The Globe and Mail January 30, 1975.
110 Six months' "protection" is derived from a sentence of less than eighteen months
either by using the normal remission and normal figures calculated above (.75 x 18 x
.339 = 4.6 months reduction in sentence) or by merely taking one-third of the sentence
imposed as the amount within the control of the NPB.
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course, they will be committed against a different sort of victim. 120 Finally, it
is not as though those released were being licensed to commit further offences
with impunity. They are still subject to the sanctions of the criminal law, and
it operates with extra severity on those who have already spent time in prison.12
We must conclude that it is unlikely in the extreme that the quality and
quantity of protection make it worth all the bother and expense of the selection process. In fact, to all that has just been said, we might add the observation that whatever useful protection function is now served by the NPB could
just as usefully be served by the sentencer, because the passage of time does
not improve the ability to predict what a prisoner is likely to do when re122
leased.
But we ought to go further and question the whole idea of parole as
public protection. Presumably it is based on a conception of the sentence
of imprisonment as a device for incapacitating or at least segregating the
offender. However, this must play a very minor part in most sentences of
imprisonment because most sentences of imprisonment are so short, and the
costs of imprisonment so vastly outweigh the "harm" which incapacitation
prevents in most cases. Certainly there are some dangerous offenders from
whom total protection at the costs of prison is necessary. But they are far
too few to justify the erection of a sentencing or parole system. 123 Incapacitation as a justifying aim most probably originated as a rationalization for retributively motivated mutilation and capital punishment. Given its slenderness, its persistence in official writings is somewhat puzzling. It is as if with
the decline of retribution, some other justification for imprisonment had to
be dreamed up which emphasized a fault in the offender -

general deterrence

being too conceptual and utilitarian, special deterrence being too obviously
a failure, and rehabilitation being too non-punitive. Ultimately, though, the
constant harping on the "protection of society" is probably best explained as
just one facet of the broader public relations picture.
12o Less "innocent" victims (other inmates) or better prepared victims (staff and
the administration in general); nevertheless, according to the official rhetoric, everybody
is entitled to equal protection from victimization: "The basic purpose of criminal justice
is to protect allmembers of society, including the offender himself, from seriously harmful and dangerous conduct." (my emphasis): Ouimet Report, supra, note 8 at 11.
For descriptions of criminal goings-on in prison, see W. E. Mann, Society Behind
Bars: A Sociological Scrutiny of Guelph Reformatory (Toronto: Social Publishers,
1967); D. D. Akman, Homicides and Assaults in Canadian Reformatories (1966), 8
Can. J. Corr. 284; G. Sykes, The Society of Captives (Princeton: Princeton U. Press,
1958) at 65-78.
12
1Rubin, supra, note 33 at 650: "A new crime committed by a released prisoner
gives rise to a new prosecution, which is all the protection needed under law."
For the effect of a prison record on sentencing, see R. v. Simmons et al. (1973),
13 C.C.C. (2d) 65 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Bear et al. (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 570 (Sask.
C.A.).
122 See supra, note 97.
123 Of the total persons convicted in 1971, only about seven percent of offences
include the type of conduct which might potentially be regarded "dangerous"; of these,
less than half actually were imprisoned: Statistics Canada, supra, note 3.
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Paroleand Public Relations
Take the statement, "justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."' 24 There is nothing much wrong
with it on its face. In fact, it seems to demonstrate a quite democratic concern for public involvement in, or at least understanding of, official action.
But what if the demonstration of justice interferes with the doing of it? Or
what if justice is being demonstrated when it is not actually being done? Then
we are in the realm of public relations, not justice. Of course, in our society
governments are expected to do this sort of thing, and though it is lamentable, it does not concern us here. What concerns us is the pseudo-justification
of penal practices on the basis that they are good public relations - that they
lead the public to believe it is getting what it wants or at least will tolerate
when it is not getting either - as if this were the same or as legitimate as
justifying a practice on the basis that it is inherently right or results in the
greatest good for the greatest number.
25
This is what Irvin Waller has to say about parole:1
5.

"We have attempted to be realistic in assessing the effectiveness of parole in
changing behaviour. This is not necessarily to challenge its raison d'etre, for while
it may fail in one area, it has other valuable functions: avoidance of the construction cost of new prisons, the relief of overcrowding, humanitarian considerations, and the need to placate public opinion with the claim that justice is
being done and protection being given, even though criminals are being set free."
(my emphasis)
26
And Norval Morris, in a similar vein:'

"... more importantly, one latent function of parole must be mentioned. The
judge imposes sentence at a time of high emotional response to the facts of the
crime. Even within our grossly dilatory system of justice, the sentence follows
closely upon the -public narration of the criminal events, if not upon the commission of the crime. A parole board, however, may make its decision in what
one hopes will be a less punitive social atmosphere. One important latent purpose of probation is to allow a judge to give the appearance of doing something
while in fact doing nothing. Similarly, one latent purpose of the division of power
between judge and parole board is to give the possibility of some clemency while
appearing in the public eye to be imposing a more severe punishment."

What is wrong with this sort of argument? For two things, deceitfulness
and elitism. Neither have any place in moral or rational discourse. Arguments
of this style, which have no validity for, indeed cannot meaningfully be addressed to, the great mass of the members of a community, have absolutely
no value for that community. Where this sort of thing passes for rational
justification at all it is a sorry comment on the state of democracy.
In any event, the whole public relations point of view assumes that
behind the elaborate smokescreen of parole something progressive and humane, even if merely humane, is being done which must be protected from
124 Lord

at 259.

Hewart, C.J., in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex p. McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256

125 Supra, note 2 at 16.
226 Supra, note 5 at 48.
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the destructive grasp of the vicious, backward masses. It is this position that
I earlier sought to discredit. To the extent that I was successful, deceit has
not merely been in vain, but has backfired. It has operated to bolster and
protect a process opposite to that intended - assuming, of course, the intentions were indeed humane in the first.place.
E. THE FUTURE OF PAROLE: THREE REPORTS
Each of the last three years has brought with it a governmental report
on the subject of parole. In 1973 it was the Hugessen Report;12 in 1974, the
GoldenbergReport;128 and this year, somewhat more diversified, the Law Reform Commission of Canada's Working Paper11: Imprisonment and Release.
The Chairman of the NPB has announced that legislation embodying some
of the recommendations of the Goldenberg Report is imminent.' 29 Here are
some of the things we can probably expect for the future.
1.

More Due Process

This was recommended, in one way or another, by all three committees.
The most conservative was the Goldenberg Report, but even it contained recommendations for fuller statutory hearing rights on the granting and cancellation of parole, including the right to be present, to see the material on
which the decision was based, to have reasons for the decision and to have
non-legal counsel.' 30 Only the Hugessen Committee recommended legal counsel and then only for cancellation hearings.' 31 Both it and the Law Reform
Commission
were in favour of some form of judicial superintendence of
2
parole.'1
If implemented, these reforms will rectify to some extent the characteristic
Canadian lag behind American law in the provision of fundamental procedural safeguards.'m The failure in this realm has typically been justified on
grounds of rehabilitation, administrative convenience and control, which, it
was said, left no room for rights and adversarial contests.1 4 A change would,
therefore, be welcome not only in its own right, but also as reflecting a shift
simultaneously away from parole as rehabilitation and towards more respect
for the prisoner as a human being.
12 7 Supra, note 20.
12 8 Supra, note 25.

The Globe and Mail, September 12, 1974.
' oSupra, note 25, recommendations 36-40, 63.
131 Id., recommendation 47; also, generally, 31-35, 43-46.
132 1d., recommendations 36, 56, 57; Law Reform Commission of Canada, W.P.
#11 at 41-44.
188 Compare Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and United States ex rel
Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.(2d) 925 (1974)
with In re McCaud (1964), 43 C.R. 252 and Howarth v. National ParoleBoard (1974),
18 C.C.C. (2d) 385.
134 See R. R. Price, Bringing the Rule of Law to Corrections (1974), 16 Can. J.
129
8

Corr. 209.
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2.

Reduced Sanctions for Parole Violation
Both the Hugessen and Goldenberg Committees recommended that time
successfully served on parole be credited to the prisoner against his sentence
even though his parole is ultimately cancelled. 35 It is not easy to gauge the
significance of this'because the prior practice was so unnecessarily severe as
to lack conceivable justification. Perhaps it heralds a more tolerant approach
to parole violation and a less hysterical concern with "the protection of society".
3.

The End of Remission and the Rise of Mandatory Supervision

Both the Hugessen and Goldenberg Committees would abolish remission 5 6 and there does not seem much room for it in the Law Reform Commission's scheme. All seem to favour a universal scheme of mandatory supervision. 137 However, we have no indication that these recommendations will be
adopted. If they should be, it is interesting to speculate on what would happen
to parole. Of course, any residual control-through-time function would devolve on parole. This would be consistent with both the Hugessen and Law
Reform Commission approaches (the latter of which, for all the world, resembles Alexander Maconochie's system more than any other' 38 ) though not
with Goldenberg, which clings most tenaciously to rehabilitation as a justifying
aim. 3 9 The times are probably with the former two, and one could probably
look forward to a period of parole as a combination of behaviour control
and protection of society. Beyond that it is hard to tell what would happen:
Would the new guise give parole survival power? Or would it become discredited and wither like remission? The answers to these questions await
more years and more reports. In the meantime, parole's juggernaut continues
to roll mindlessly over time, money, prisoners and public alike.
13 5 The Hugessen Report, supra, note 20, recommendation 49; Goldenberg Report,
supra, note 25, recommendation 67.
36
1
The Hugessen Report, id., recommendation 22; the Goldenberg Report, id.,
recommendation 6.
36
1
The Hugessen Report, id., recommendation 22; the Goldenberg Report, id.,
recommendation 41; Law Reform Commission, supra, note 132, at 38.
13 8 The Justice Minister's recent noises of approval for the Law Reform Commission's scheme (The Globe and Mail, July 24, 1975) prompt further comment. The
scheme is predicated on a three part sentencing system based on the purposes of the
sentence: public protection (maximum 20 years), denunciation (maximum 3 years), and
enforcement of non-custodial measures (maximum 6 months). Early release or parole
would be available on a public protection basis in a number of stages passed through
by good behaviour where the purpose was protection; where it was enforcement, when
the fine was paid, etc. But as for denunciation - and this would surely be the bulk of
the sentences of imprisonment - early release would only be based on humanitarian
considerations, would be exceptional and would be determined only by a court.
It may be that such a sentencing system is not feasible. Or perhaps there would be
no way to prevent judges from using "protection of society" as a ruse to effect longer
"denunciatory" sentences. But if such a system were faithfully adhered to, the NPB
would be out of business. There simply are not enough genuinely protective sentences
to go around.
Is this the way parole ends?
139 Supra, note 25 at 5: "Parole must be a positive step in the correctional process"; at 44: "Parole is an aid to social integration of offenders".
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APPENDIX A
Breakdown of "volumes of activities" of National Parole Service for
1973-74 (n. 12).
Activity

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Visits to Institutions
Inmate Briefing Sessions
Inmate Interviews
Case Submissions
Cases Reviewed in Board Panel Hearings
Community Assessments
(a) completed by Parole Officers
(b) completed by Contracting Agencies
7. Supervision
(a) by Parole Officers
(b) by Agencies
8. Revocations and Forfeitures
9. Cases Reviewed in Case Conferences

Volume

Hours per unit

12,917
1,000
28,875
14,824
1,529

1.5
2.0
1.0
4.0
1.5

7,473
3,714

4.0
1.0

3,682
2,180
1,460
16,571

2.0
0.5
3.0
0.5

Definitions and Explanations
1.

Number of Visits to Institutions
This item is primarily intended to cover travelling time and informal
discussions with institutional staff and inmates on case progress to get small
bits of information, etc. Each separate visit to an institution should be counted
regardless of purpose to account for travelling time.
2. Inmate Briefing Sessions
This is a count of group meetings to explain to inmates how the parole
process works and what their rights and responsibilities are.
3,

Number of Interviews with Inmates
This item is intended to cover both face to face time spent with inmates
in formal interviews to prepare release plans, collect information for case
preparation, discuss reasons for suspension, explain Board decisions, etc.,
and the time required to record the results of interviews.
4.

Submissions
These items represent a count of all completed case submissions to the
Board for definitive decisions plus cases completed for mandatory supervision
releases.
5. Panel Hearings- Number of Cases
This is to cover extra time required to organize cases for panel review
and to present the case to the panel. Count all cases reviewed including those
which have to be forwarded to Headquarters for more votes.
6.

Community Assessments Completed
(a) by staff - This is a count of all community assessments by the

1975]

Rethinking Parole
staff of the particular District Office for inmate cases, whether as

post-sentence reports, for Temporary Absences, for parole applications (including Day, Temporary and Re-Parole) or for mandatory supervision cases. It is intended to cover travelling time and
recording time.
(b) by agencies, etc. - This is a count of all community assessments
for inmate cases completed in the area by other than NIPS staff
members. It is intended to cover time required for allocation,
follow-up and reviewing.
7.

Cases under Supervision
Includes Day Paroles, Full Paroles, and Mandatory Supervision cases.

8.

Revocations and Forfeitures
This time allowance is based upon counts of decisions by the Board as
an indirect measure of time involvement of District Office staff in suspending and working with suspended clients and in attending court sessions
for clients charged with new offences.
9.

Cases Reviewed in Case Conferences
This is a count of in-depth reviews of cases being prepared for Board
submissions (or mandatory supervision release) with institutional personnel,
visitors to the institution or employers or school authorities who have had
contact with the inmate while incarcerated and of cases under supervision
with community agencies providing services to clients, police, etc.

APPENDIX B
A study was undertaken, so far as available statistics would allow, of
the distribution of sentences for all indictable offences and for robbery in
order to ascertain whether any impact which the availability of parole might
have had on sentence length was discernible. Tables B1 and B2 give the
results.
If parole were having an effect on sentence length which was discernible
from the tables, one would expect to see a shift towards longer sentences in
periods of greater parole activity and a contrary shift in periods of lesser
parole activity. Changes in sentence length appear in the tables as changes in
the breakdown of prison sentences between those that were under two years in
duration and those that were for two years or longer. The level of parole
activity is indicated by the ratio of paroles to sentences of imprisonment for
all indictable offences. This, of course, takes no account of the effect which
a policy of earlier or later parole dates may have had on sentence length.
Furthermore, the level of parole activity could only be expected to have an
effect on sentence length to the extent that judges have been aware of changes
in it.
Turning to the tables themselves, it is readily apparent that little support for the thesis advanced above can be found in them. With limited exceptions (such as the dramatic but temporary lengthening of sentences for rob-
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bery on the introduction of parole in 1899-1903 and to a lesser extent in
1959-63) sentence lengths seem to have fluctuated independently of the
parole rate.
It is clear that no safe conclusions can be derived from these figures. The
reader should be specifically cautioned against concluding from the fact that
sentences of imprisonment are no longer for all indictable offences (indeed,
are shorter) and only modestly longer for robbery since the introduction of
parole that parole has had little or no effect on sentence length. For all we
can know from these figures sentences of imprisonment may have been much
shorter still had there been no parole system.
We are thrust back, inevitably, on the indirect evidence of admissions,
documented cases and common sense.
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